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Briefly Noted

Leadership Succession in the SOZG

Moscow's satrap for the SOZG (Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany), Walter ~~ULBRICHT~~, will be 71 this summer. Apart from being in the precarious position of all Communist dictators, he has been reported to suffer from different physical ills that might carry him off. His removal from the scene could trigger a typical Communist dogfight over who will inherit the mantle of power. Erich HONECKER has for some time been judged the most likely successor for Ulbricht as First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party (SED). A summary of biographic data on Honecker is appended to this BPG as an unclassified attachment to be kept in station files against the contingency of Ulbricht's removal and/or a succession crisis in the SOZG.

Spanish CP Given Undue Credit

In a 13 May New York Times article datelined Madrid, the Franco Government was reported claiming that Communist influence is causing the current labor unrest in northwest Spain. The Spanish newspapers and radio, closely controlled by the Franco regime, were said to have first ignored the strike of miners and metal workers in the Asturias region. Then, in a newspaper and radio campaign, the troubles were laid to Communist instigation. It was further reported that on the local scene backers of the regime have formed a "labor front" apparently aimed at improving relations between workers and management. The new organization was said to have put up posters in Asturian towns warning workers against "Communist maneuvers."

There is no evidence or belief that the Spanish CP is actually the prime mover behind the strikes - the causes appear to be purely economic. It is predictable, however, that the Communists will not fail to move in and grab all possible credit for doing something real for the workers. In short, the Spanish Government is repeating the mistakes of the Nazis and Vichy, who unintentionally built up the stature and strength of the French CP by giving it the undeserved reputation of having initiated most acts of WW II resistance in France.

Press assets which deal with news of the Asturias strikes and further developments in Spain should be asked to insert low-keyed comment that the official Spanish line risks giving altogether undeserved benefits to the Spanish CP.

CPSU After the Thermidor.

The CPSU had 7.2 million members in January 1956, just before its 20th Congress. At the time of the 22nd Congress in October 1961, Party membership had increased by 2.5 million to 9.7 million (announced in *Partiinaya Zhizn* -- Party Life -- in its January 1962 issue). Since the 22nd Congress, membership has increased at an even faster pace, by almost 2.3 million in 3 years, to approximately 11 million (January 1964).

The Russian Revolution of 1917 has often been compared with the French Revolution of 1789 which entered its Thermidor phase when Robespierre was overthrown on 27 July 1794 (9 Thermidor on the Revolutionary calendar). Robespierre's death marked the end of the reign of terror -- as did Stalin's in Russia -- the beginning of the 5-man Directory government of mediocre men (the best had been killed) and the growth of public opinion influence.

The huge mass Party of Khrushchev no longer resembles the Party of Lenin -- the hard core vanguard, an elite of professional revolutionaries. It is no longer led by a dedicated revolutionary elite but by a vast bureaucracy of party functionaries. The Party has increased by some 54% since Khrushchev came to power.

Bias in selection of new party members is clear. The "typical" party member is Russian, male, urban and from the upper middle class. Sex and ethnic biases noted in the 35% membership increase from 1956 to 1961 appear to have been maintained. Less than 3% of all adult women are members (about one fifth of the Party) against some 13% of the adult male population. Russians accounted for some 64% of the Party but only 55% of the population in 1961 while Moldavians were underrepresented (by 74%), Baltic peoples (by 54%), Central Asians (by 47%) etc. While the Party is supposed to be composed of workers and peasants, it is weighted to urban groups and within these to upper middle and above economic groups.

The coming 170th anniversary of the French Thermidor provides one among many opportunities to discuss the nature of the CPSU and the Soviet society today -- a topic of particular interest to Communist Parties around the world as well as to leaders in developing countries. On the one hand attention can be called to the inevitable end of terrorist regimes (the revolution devours its children, -- Communist China will follow the USSR in this process), to the failure of revolutionary forces to maintain a society and their replacement by mediocre men, spared during the purges of the able opposition. On the other hand, how vast a manpower is needed to maintain a dictatorship and great power chauvinism can be demonstrated on the basis of K's constant expansion of his Party machine.

What Price Soviet Aid?

Chairman Khrushchev has discovered that winning African friends away from Chinese Communists and the free world is expensive business and that his rubles do not always guarantee success. In early May Khrushchev announced a \$125 million loan to Ben Bella (to whom he also gave the Lenin Peace Prize) following a red carpet state welcome for the Algerian President in the Soviet Union. On May 24th Khrushchev himself wound up a fifteen day visit to the United Arab Republic, his first to Africa, by granting a \$277 million loan to Nasser. Both countries, the only African states receiving any substantial amount of Soviet aid, are also to receive the dubious benefits of agricultural advice and assistance. Algeria, having rid herself for political reasons of the French colons who tilled Algerian soil for generations, is now to have professional assistance from a country known throughout the world for its spectacular agricultural failures. Perhaps agronomist Khrushchev expects that the Soviet "model farm" he will send to the UAR will become, there, the model he has never achieved in the USSR.

The UAR was grateful for Soviet assistance to the Aswan Dam project but the Egyptian people made it clear that neither respect nor affection could be purchased with Soviet money. Khrushchev's popular reception was not exuberant and it became even cooler when he presumed on hospitality by attacking the UAR's friends, derogating their cherished beliefs and interfering in their internal affairs. He disparaged Arab nationalism and Arab unity and urged his audience to substitute Lenin's unity of worker and peasant in a class struggle. He spoke disparagingly of the small but wealthy Arab Kuwait and of the emir who has assisted many Arab countries including the UAR. He recognized Arab socialism but implied that such forms of national socialism were simply early steps toward Communist-style "socialism." He harangued against Western aid (the USA, for instance, has provided \$750 million in aid to the UAR over the past ten years) as imperialistic and dangerous, his own as open handed and friendly.

Khrushchev probably sought a double goal in Africa: to convince Africans that they should look to USSR, not Communist China, for Communist leadership and assistance; to deliver a blow at Western non-Communist influence on the continent. But he may have overplayed his hand. The proud, religious Arab peoples apparently refused to respond to the atheist leader who seemed to be saying, "Now that we have given you so much money and assistance we will tell you how to achieve real socialism and what foreign policies to follow." The African countries below the Sahara, noting the communiques which concluded both Ben Bella's visit to Moscow and Khrushchev's to the UAR, may question whether support to Soviet foreign policies over the globe is not too high a price for OAU countries committed by charter to strict non-alignment.

DATES OF [REDACTED] INTEREST

June Afro-Asian Islamic Conference, Preparatory Meeting, Djak. 1964--full conference in late 1964, early 65.

17 June German Day of Unity (W Ger) commemorating E Ger worker /youth riots 16-17 June 1953 quelled by Sov troops.

17 June Hungary announces trial, execution of Imre Nagy, 1953.

19 June Tibet: International Commission of Jurists charges Chicom with genocide, 1960.

23 June All-Christian Peace Conference; Prague, 28 June - 3 July

29 June Ruthenia (formerly part of Czechoslovakia) ceded to USSR, 1945)

1 July Communist Party of China founded. 1921

2 July Afro-Asian Women's Conference, Djakarta, July 2-10.

5 July Conference for Denuclearization of Mediterranean Basin, WPC-promoted, Algiers, July 5-9.

10 July Korea ceasefire negotiations begin 1951. (Armistice signed by UN, N.K. and Comm. China 27 July 1953.)

10 July Arrest of Lavrenti Beria for treason announced. 1953. (Secretly tried and shot 13-23 Dec. 1953).

13 July President Urrutia, in TV address, charges Communism endangers Cuban revolution. 1959.

13 July Pope Pius XII excommunicates all defending Communist anti-Christian doctrines; bars from sacraments those reading CP doctrine. 1949.

19 July Laos becomes independent by treaty with France, 1949.

23 July Geneva Agreements guaranteeing Laos' independence and neutrality. 1962.

25 July Puerto Rico elevated to free commonwealth associated with U.S. 1952.

27 July French Thermidor 170th anniversary. Robespierre overthrown, guillotined following day. 1794

31 July 30,444 refugees register during July at West Berlin receiving center (highest total since March 1953). 1961.

31 July Agreement reached for Federation of Malaysia. 1962

GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#29

9-22 May 1964

Commentary

Principal Developments:

1. The Chinese disseminated widely, at the beginning of the period, the hitherto private CCP-CPSU letter exchange mentioned in #28. These texts are so revealing and so rich in materials for varied propaganda exploitation that they are treated in a separate Guidance, No. 739.

2. The Soviets, in an authoritative 3-part series of editorials in Pravda May 10-12, made a further effort to grapple with the apparent contradictions in their "new look" approach to relations within the movement and to spell out their case against the CCP. The first emphasizes the need for "ideological unity," because under present conditions, in which the WCM is made up of equal and independent parties and there can be no hierarchical relations of leadership and subjection, "the only form of union can and must be a voluntary union of people who think alike." Without ideological unity, Communism "would be transformed into an amorphous conglomeration of parties incapable of acting in a common line." The CPSU says that it took the initiative in giving up the leading role which was once accorded to it -- over the objections of the Chinese: it is now clear that they tried to keep the "office" of head of the movement "in order to usurp it in due course." In damning the Chinese, Pravda asserts baldly: "The Communist movement does not, however, believe in prophets and oracles who think and decide for all....!"

In the second, Pravda postulates "a creative attitude toward theory" as the most important principle of M-L and accuses Chinese theoreticians of attitudes toward "what was written 100, 50, or 30 years ago" like those of "churchmen to the Old and New Testament." The Chinese attempt to use the analogy of Lenin and the Second International against the CPSU "turns against them," because it was Lenin who creatively enriched Marxism and who vanquished the dogmatists of the S.I. It closes complaining about the Chinese "peculiar idea of socialism," -- "without democracy, justice and respect for the rights of the individual."

The third discusses "the conceptions of 'Sinofied Marxism,' their "lack of coordination," "self-contradiction," "most curious interweaving of the most obtuse dogmatism and the most flagrant revisionism," "inconsistency of views," and most important, "the glaring gap" between their noisy revolutionary phrases and their practical deeds.

Soviet state organ Izvestiya also started "the first of a series of editorials on the new line"

state" on the 13th -- and followed with a two-part article on May 22 and 23. The first is devoted largely to the erroneous Chinese concepts and abuses of the dictatorship of the proletariat: "distorting Lenin," they regard it "as an instrument of coercion, saying nothing about the main, the most essential element -- that the proletarian dictatorship is democracy for the working people."

3. The "struggle between two diametrically opposite lines" brought scandalous scenes and bitter attacks at three more international meetings during this period, with the Soviet-aligned majority managing to "railroad through" its documents: see accounts of Bucharest "Second International Conference on Problems of Employed Women," May 11-16; Moscow "Fourth International Miners Trade Union Conference," May 12-15; and Warsaw "Second International Conference of Commerce Workers," May 21.

4. The Mongolian Foreign Ministry on May 15 demanded for the fourth time that Chinese in Mongolia cease disseminating propaganda materials.

5. East German boss Ulbricht's visit to Hungary elicited Kadar's support for a world party meeting, and Soviet media added the parties of Belgium, Costa Rica, and Uruguay to its list of similar supporters. The Swiss Labor Party confirmed support of the CPSU line but did not mention a conference. The Swedish Party came out against one at this time. The Albanians voted for one, but set up wildly extreme conditions which the CPSU could not consider. (Our unofficial count shows that 23 pro-Soviet parties -- exclusive of the CPSU -- have been reported by Soviet or friendly media as unqualifiedly supporting the calling of a world meeting, of which 5 are ruling parties -- with Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia absent. Another 15 or more non-ruling parties are reported as having affirmed their support of the CPSU line since April 3 without mentioning a world meeting. On the other side, the Chinese, Albanians and North Vietnamese have called for a world meeting, but the conditions set by the first two are so extreme as to preclude the possibility of holding one. This means that about half of the world's parties have not been reported as expressing themselves at all since the Soviet drive began on April 3, and only about 30% have indicated readiness to go along with the kind of meeting the CPSU would call.)

Significance:

"A spectre is haunting the CPSU -- the spectre of a World Communist Movement 'transformed into an amorphous conglomeration of parties incapable of acting in a common line!'" We might thus borrow from Marx and the 10 May Pravda editorial to depict the dilemma in which the CPSU theoreticians are squirming as they try to preserve as much as possible of the old movement's

working discipline -- "cohesion" and "unity and agreement in action" are the terms they use -- while developing a new posture as champions of "independence," "equality," and even "democracy" against the inhumane, Stalinist, CCP tyrants.

Soviet efforts to blacken the Chinese and curry favor with other parties have now led them into such radically "liberal" statements as the following:

- "The Communist movement does not believe in prophets and oracles who think and decide for all." (10 May Pravda) [Then what's all this fuss about what Marx, Engels or Lenin wrote so long ago?]
- "There are no, and cannot be any, 'father' or 'son' parties." (7 March CPSU letter to CCP, with similar formulation in 10 May Pravda)
- "Nobody can know the problems of struggle of the workers in developed, capitalist countries better than the CPs of those countries." (10 May Pravda) This is straight from Togliatti's CPI line: the 22 April Rumanian statement extended it to include any country, and the CPSU will undoubtedly do so before long.
- The Chinese are guilty of "a peculiar kind of socialism," -- "without democracy, justice, and respect for the rights of the individual." (10 May Pravda) Further, "the proletarian dictatorship is democracy for the people," though the Chinese regard it as an "instrument of coercion." Moreover, they even use party organs in the role of a "commanding force" among the people. (16 May Izvestiya)

With the publication of the 7 March CPSU letter, the Rumanian 22 April "declaration of independence" seems somewhat less audacious (though no less significant) than at first. Note that the "no 'father' and 'son' parties" statement, which had appeared to be one of the strongest formulations in the Rumanian statement, had appeared verbatim in the CPSU letter, a copy of which had undoubtedly been given to them.

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#29

3-22 May 1964

May 9: All Peking papers give first 4 pages to texts of 7 letters exchanged by CCP and CPSU which were mentioned in #28 and are summarized under separate cover.

May 9 and continuing: Khrushchev arrives in Alexandria to begin his 16-day UAR visit. Soviet media continue to publicize support of the CPSU line. Counted for the first time were Belgian, Costa Rican and Uruguayan CP's, all calling for a conference, and the Swiss Labor Party, which does not. Ulbricht's visit to Hungary elicited Kadar's support for a world conference at a mass rally on May 11. Not reported by Soviet media (to our knowledge) was a Swedish CP statement, signed by Hermansson in the name of the Party and published in SKP daily Ny Dag May 13, opposing the calling of a world conference "under present circumstances." On the 13th, however, Pravda did finally publish an edited version of Italian CP boss Togliatti's April 22 speech omitting his warning against "excommunicating" the Chinese but reflecting his reservations re feasibility of a conference.

May 9-15: A series of "government statements" by the 5 Central Asian Soviet Republics protest the Chinese attempt at the Djakarta Afro-Asian preparatory meeting (see Chrono, April 26 and May 4) "to exclude the multi-national Soviet Union from Asian countries" -- Turismen on 9th; Kazakh, 10th; Uzbek, 11th; Tadzhik, 13th; and Kirgiz, 15th. Kazakh statement says: "The Kazakh SSR, with a territory of nearly 3 million square kilometers, is -- whether the Chinese leaders want it or not -- an integral part of the Soviet Union situated in the center of Asia."

May 10-12: Pravda publishes a 3-part series of major editorial articles of about 3,000 words each, on the general theme: "Marxism-Leninism is an International Movement of Communists of All Countries." An introduction to the first states: "The Chinese leaders have declared open ideological and political war" on the UCM and "embarked on the course of splitting it, while covering up their subversive activities with a 'hullabaloo about defending M-L theory.'" Thus, "the struggle for ideological unity," which "acquires a primary importance," will be dealt with in this series.

The first is entitled: "Ideological Unity is the Basis of the Cohesion of the Communist Movement." It begins by emphasizing "the enormous significance of the task of rallying the ICM," of developing a "cohesion" which is "not simply a statement...but unity and agreement in action" on the basis of M-L. "Even the Comintern, with its statutes binding on all parties, was able to unite Communists of different countries only by relying on their ideological unity." Now, when there is no such organization and "forms of communications between parties have become different," and in view of all of "the

the Communist movement and all revolutionary forces," the need for ideological unity is greater than ever.

"Without ideological unity, Communism would cease to be a world movement and would be transformed into an amorphous conglomeration of parties incapable of acting in a common line."

"It is understandable that in the WCM, which consists of equal and independent parties, there is not and cannot be hierarchical relations of leadership and subjection. It follows precisely from this that the only form of union can and must be a voluntary union of people who think alike, guaranteeing the equality and independence of parties and at the same time insuring the cohesion, unity, and coordination of action and voluntary discipline in carrying out the general line of the WCM."

"Such an alliance can only be formed...on the platform of creative Marxism...."

The "creative development of theory" must be the "collective work of all M-L parties," "not so much by efforts in study as by practical activity...."

"Each party makes its contribution to the common treasure house of Marxism by basing itself first of all on its own direct experience. Nobody, for instance, can know the problems of struggle of the workers in developed capitalist countries better than the CPs of these countries.... Every new word in Marxism is not passed down peremptorily from the summit of a theoretical Olympus but is checked in practical activities, discussed at international Communist forums, and becomes the possession of the whole movement.... In theoretical disputes between those who are Communists and think alike, there must be no room for sectarian and fanatic intolerance to different opinions which might befit medieval monks but in no way M-Ls."

Pravda then turns on the Chinese leaders, who have "trampled upon and rejected" all these norms and even propagate the dialectics of splitting to justify their undermining activities.

posing as supreme judges
"The Chinese leaders, /..quite openly assume some special rights in the field of M-L theory. The Communist movement does not, however, believe in prophets and oracles who think and decide for all, as Stalin tried to do in his time...."

"The rich experience of the CPSU and its services to the Communist movement..."
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to a tradition according to which our Party was given a special and a leading position which was confirmed in general documents of the C. movement. The CC of our Party took the initiative to put an end to this tradition, even against the insistence of a number of other parties, among which one of the most active -- strange as this may sound today -- was precisely the CCP...."

"The real meaning of such a position of the CCP leaders has become quite clear today. The crux of the matter seems to be that the Chinese leaders sought officially even then to institute an 'office' at the head of the C. movement in order to usurp it in due course....Peking now states that the theoretical generalization of the historic tasks of the present day has fallen completely on the shoulders of Mao Tse-tung alone, and our very epoch is that of Mao Tse-tung's...."

The second article is entitled: "What Are the Chinese Leaders Foisting on the Communist Movement Under the Guise of M-L?" It is a sharply pointed exposition of previously stated CPSU criticisms. "The Chinese leaders are revising M-L teaching," rejecting one of its most important principles -- "a creative attitude toward theory."

"They appraise all propositions of creative Marxism put forward by the modern generation of M-Ls from the point of view of...what was written 100, 50, or 30 years ago....Chinese theoreticians regard M-L as having been created for all times with the introduction of inalterable rules, principles and slogans, to which the attitude of Communists should be similar to the attitude of churchmen to the Old and New Testament. Such an approach to theory is organically alien to Marx, Engels and Lenin...."

Pravda notes that "the CCP leaders try to conceal their break with M-L by references to the history of the movement," but "the analogy turns against" them, because it was Lenin who creatively enriched Marxism and who triumphed over the dogmatic, doctrinaire leaders of the Second International.

It ends with criticisms of the Chinese "fetish of violence," and "peculiar idea of socialism: without developed industry, without democracy, justice, and respect for the rights of the individual; and perpetuating the poverty and privation of the laboring masses."

The final article is entitled: "The Political Sense of the Theoretical Conceptions of the Chinese Leaders."

"If we turn to the conceptions of the so-called 'Sinified Marxism,' we are struck by their lack of coordination, their self-contradiction, their most curious interweaving of the most obtuse dogmatism and the most flagrant revisionism, the inconsistency of views, and finally and most important by the glaring gap between the noisy revolutionary phrases and the practical deeds of the CCP leaders."

"If required by considerations of national policy, the Chinese leaders, without batting an eyelid, cast aside both their revolutionary phrases and their theoretical concepts," as demonstrated by their "entering a border conflict" with non-aligned India and then proclaiming their friendship with SEATO- and CENTO-aligned Pakistan. The latest example is "their theory of the so-called 'intermediate' zone between socialist countries and the U.S.,...aimed at broadening cooperation with imperialist countries such as France, Japan, West Germany and Britain."

"...Peking's theoretical concepts are called upon to provide a foundation and justification for the great-power and nationalist path of the Chinese leaders, to contribute to their hegemonistic claims, to split the world liberation struggle, and to draw under Chinese leadership certain circles both within the Communist movement and outside of it....

"The CCP leaders themselves...have achieved a situation in which a determined ideological struggle against their ideological-political platform has become the road to unity. Marxist-Leninists have no other way out...."

May 11: The fourth volume of "Anti-China Materials from the Soviet Press, published by the World Culture Publishing House in Peking, went on sale throughout China: NCNA says that it includes 32 anti-China articles from 26 publications.

May 11-16: The "Second International Conference on Problems of Employed Women," held in Bucharest under WFTU auspices, produced further bitter, public struggle, according to reporting by NCNA and Tanyug (the Rumanian press was silent on the controversies). It began at the opening session but the real fireworks exploded after WFTU SecyGen Saillant delivered his report and the Chinese chief delegate Chi Yuan-te attacked it, "analyzing the two diametrically opposite political lines in the international women workers movement." The Indonesian, Albanian, Korean, Cuban, Japanese, Malian, Nigerian and Chilean delegates are cited by NCNA as supporting the Chinese line, but they were opposed by "crude slanders and attacks" by the Italian, French,

Czech, Bulgarian and Mongolian delegates. "But their hooliganism failed to interrupt the Chinese delegate's speech. Then some of the...delegates stood up and threatened to walk out of the conference. When it was clear that few would follow them, they shamefacedly sat down again...."

At the conclusion, the Soviets, "ganging up with their followers" and "manipulating the drafting subcommittee meeting," "railroaded two documents which contain a series of erroneous views" through the voting. The Chinese issued a statement which charged that "a handful of persons manipulated by the leaders of the Soviet delegation attempted to impose a capitulationist line" and "went so far as to create an extremely foul atmosphere by making a din and booing during the conference. This was a grave act of splittism to undermine unity."

May 12: Tokyo's Mainichi Daily News carries a dispatch from its Moscow correspondent on Mikoyan's scheduled May 13-16 visit to Japan (see Chrono, May 1), describes two factors behind the Soviet "sweeping reappraisal" of their Japan policy: (1) the Japanese people harbor traditionally strong affinity toward the Chinese people and recent signs indicate closer ties between the two countries; and (2) the Japanese CP and Japan-Soviet Association have come to be dominated by pro-Chinese forces. "Under the circumstances, the Soviet Union is expected to make positive approaches to the leading circles of Japan, namely the leader of the government, the tory party and the business world."

UPI reports from Moscow that, according to "diplomatic sources," refugees are crossing from China to Soviet territory at the rate of 1200 a month to escape Chinese persecution.

May 12-15: The Fourth International Miners Trade Union Conference in Moscow was the scene of further public battling, with NCNA describing events similar to those at Bucharest (see May 11-16 above). Again the Chinese, Albanian, Korean, Indonesian, and others attacked the erroneous line of the revisionists but the Soviet manipulators "resorted to the despicable and undemocratic practice of railroading through two documents which were non-revolutionary and did not combat imperialism." The Chinese denounced these tactics and introduced an amendment. "While he was speaking, a number of people behaved uncouthly by pounding their cups, booing and stamping their feet. What is worse, those who manipulated the conference turned off the public address system...."

May 13: Chinese and Soviet representatives in Peking signed, after difficult negotiations carried on since January, a 1934 trade protocol and "a protocol on the payment ahead of schedule by China of the 1930 trade arrears owed to the Soviet Union," which, according to NCNA, "calls for the completion of the payment in 1964, one year ahead of schedule."

Peking press features a "summary of the political report made Approved For Release 2000/04/14 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080001-2

Party": actually it was the rump congress of pro-Chinese dissidents reported in Chrono, January 18-19!

May 14-17: The French CP's 17th Congress brought reaffirmation for Moscow's position in the Sino-Soviet conflict, and the selection of Waldeck Rochet as new SecyGen, replacing the ailing Maurice Thorez who was moved upstairs to a newly created post of President.

May 15: The Mongolian Party daily Unen publishes a statement which noted that on 23 June, 3 July and 11 September 1963 the Minister of Foreign Affairs had delivered memoranda to the Chinese Embassy demanding that it stop the dissemination among the population of books, pamphlets, magazines, and bulletins "propagandizing the mistaken views of the CCP leaders on the major problems of our time," limiting it to distribution only through the MPR Foreign Ministry and the Executive Committee of Mongolian Peace and Friendship Organizations. "In this connection, the MPR Foreign Ministry delivered a note to the CPR Embassy in the MPR on 15 May 1964" which "again denounced these activities" as "a gross violation of the norms of mutual relations between states and as a direct interference in the internal affairs of the MPR." It "again demanded" adherence to the procedure outlined in the 23 June memorandum.

Issue No. 10 of the pro-Chinese dissident Austrian bulletin Rote Fahne (Red Flag), which had been mimeographed previously, appears in 30 printed pages, enclosing a 4-page leaflet appealing to all Austrian Communists to rally and fight the revisionist leadership of the ACP. It attacks at length the Suslov report, quotes extensively from the "independence" passages of the Rumanian statement, and carries a list of names of Austrian party functionaries said to have been "expelled from the Party or dismissed from their functions" because of support for Rote Fahne and Chinese policies.

May 15-16: The Peking press goes back to the April 22 anniversary of Lenin's birth for two anti-revisionist editorials: on the 15th from the Albanian Zeri i Popullit and on the 16th from the North Korean Nodong Sinmun.

May 15 and continuing: Senior Japanese CP member Yoshio Shiga precipitated turmoil in the ranks by casting his vote in the Diet for ratification of the test-ban treaty, in opposition to the Party's decision and the votes of the other 4 JCP members of the Diet, and then called a press conference and distributed a prepared statement of his views. At a 10-hour CC meeting on the 21st, Shiga and another pro-Soviet veteran who supported him, Ichizo Suzuki, were expelled from the Party, leading to speculation that the pro-Soviet faction may split off from the pro-Chinese mainstream.

May 13 and 22-23: On the 13th, Izvestiya carries an article "On Proletarian Dictatorship," announced as "the first in a series of editorials on theoretical problems in a socialist state." Izvestiya accuses the Chinese of "deliberately passing in silence" Lenin's emphasis "that Marx had spoken about the period of the proletarian dictatorship as a period of transition from capitalism to socialism" and trying to extend it to cover "the entire period of transition from capitalism to Communism." Further, it says:

"The Chinese leaders, distorting Leninism, regard the proletarian dictatorship primarily and even exclusively as an instrument of coercion, saying nothing about the main, the most essential element -- that the proletarian dictatorship is democracy for the working people."

Izvestiya is grieved that "the Chinese leaders assign the party organs the role of 'commanding force' instead of the role of organizers and educators of the masses. There are even such incongruous cases when a secretary of a Party committee removes a judge and begins to return decisions in court cases...."

"In China, the dictatorship of the proletariat in the absence of state and internal democracy turns into a dictatorship of a group of leaders. This practice, alien to M-L, is consummated and crowned with the cult of Mao Tse-tung. It is, therefore, quite understandable that the exposure of the Stalin personality cult by our party was received by the Chinese leaders as something directed against them...."

There were no further articles in the announced "series" until May 22 and 23, when Izvestiya published a 2-part article apparently intended as part, though not identified as such. Aimed to rebut "the vain and unsavory attempts by the Chinese leaders to cast aspersions and discredit the idea of the state of all the people," it is largely a rehash of previous Soviet pronouncements on the subject.

May 17: The Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popullit publishes a typically savage 12,000-word attack on "The Divisive Activity of the Khrushchevite Revisionists in the Light of Suslov's Report." "Their insanity indicated that they are seriously worried, alarmed, and have lost their patience, coolness and self-confidence." The only "new" passages come near the end, when it states that the Party "deems that a new meeting of the Communist and workers parties should be convoked" -- and outlines conditions for one: (1) A general discussion of all issues within each party, to insure that its delegation "will truly represent the will" of all members: to make this a "real M-L discussion, the Albanians propose a joint decision, compulsory on all parties, to publish -- in quantities sufficient for all

party members -- up to 15 basic documents of each other party.
(2) The "differences existing between the CPSU and the other M-L parties" must be settled in advance, and this would require that the CPSU leadership "publicly recognize some of its more scandalous errors": it lists 4 which K. should publicly admit.
(3) All parties, including those split off from others, must be asked to attend with equal rights. "On the other hand, the meeting cannot be attended by the renegade Tito clique...."

May 19: Two days after the death of CPSU Presidium member Otto Kuusinen, Pravda publishes his speech at the February plenum critical of the dictatorship in China.

The Peking press publishes a statement of the AAPSO Permanent Secretariat protesting against Brazil's "unwarranted arrest and persecution of 9 Chinese citizens." It also reports that the Soviet representative at the Secretariat had opposed the statement and presented an alternative draft: "The Soviet representative's efforts at sabotage aroused the indignation of the members of the secretariat."

May 20: Izvestiya carries an article by Ivan Gavrilov rebutting Chinese slander about the withdrawal of Soviet specialists, charging that "the Chinese leadership deliberately created unbearable conditions, barring any opportunity for normal work and offending their dignity." Specifically, they were "subjected to 'brainwashing' in the spirit of hostility to the CPSU/CC."

May 21: Fragmentary reports from AFP and Tanyug in Warsaw indicate that another international meeting in that city turned into a Sino-Soviet battleground: the "Second International Conference of Commerce Workers," attended by delegates from 47-50 countries.

May 22: Pravda struck back at Chinese publicizing of the rump "congress" of the pro-Chinese dissidents in Peru (see Chrono, May 13), carrying an article by "General Secretary of the Peruvian CP/CC Raul Acosta Salas." The "pseudoconference" staged by the splitters "was actually organized by the Chinese leaders," he writes, and adds that, "not satisfied with the propaganda clamor, they tried to smash up the office of the newspaper Unidad, organ of the PCP. Noteworthy also is the tragic death on his way from Cuzco to Lima of trade union leader and CC member Emiliano Umanatica, which occurred after he had drawn up a document condemning the splitters."

733. Soviet Economic Performance Vs Propaganda

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All currently available information about Soviet economic planning in 1964 suggests that decisions are being made cautiously and hesitatingly. The most reliable grain forecast (important for the whole economy) can not be made until just before the harvest and even this might prove inaccurate, especially if there is a lot of rain during the too-prolonged Soviet harvest. Presumably, in addition to waiting until there is some reliable grain forecast, an agonizing reappraisal of economic and political needs is being fought over by conflicting interests. A sudden change in Soviet economic policy -- i.e. reallocation of material and manpower for military-civilian, industrial-agricultural, and investment-consumption uses -- could be announced at any time. However, this would not change the facts that, contrary to the economic situation projected by Soviet officials over the last several years (1) the rate of economic growth took a downturn in 1959, (2) serious problems had accumulated for several years, stemming from policies followed from the beginning of Khrushchev's leadership, and (3) while an especially damaging crop failure was suffered in 1963 crops have been poor since 1959. Nor will new policies or programs change the fact that the world and, to some extent, the people of the USSR now know that CPSU officials distorted the economic picture, claimed considerably better performance than had been achieved and withheld much pertinent production data.

The 1963 Soviet digest omitted or provided exceedingly little data on several sectors of the economy -- data which has, however, been publicized in the free world. Three of the slighted sectors, particularly critical for the Soviet economy, are as follows:

1. Investment. It is admitted that total investment rose only 2.7 percent in 1963. But since capital investment is of paramount importance in the future growth of an economy, it is significant that the usual detailed treatment of this sector is avoided.

The CIA press release on 9 January 1964 said:

After 1959, however, economic growth began to slow appreciably. The rate of expansion of fixed investment, upon which growth depends, was not maintained. With annual increases in investment cut in half, falling to between 4 and 5 percent in 1962-63, a sharp curtailment in economic growth was inevitable....

To a great extent Soviet economic difficulties stem from a series of programs too ambitious for available resources....

Much of the blame for recent reductions in the rate of growth falls on the sharp increase in Soviet defense spending, which between 1959 and 1963 increased by about one-third. However, the problem centers less on the total size of defense outlays than on the diversion of scarce, critical resources -- both manpower and materials. The military "bite" was particularly severe on the best scientific and engineering talent, on the most skilled construction specialists, and on the associated high-quality materials and components. The costs of increased military efforts showed up in shortfalls in industrial investment, especially in the chemicals industry, and in the gross underfulfillment of the Soviet plan for automation and modernization in industry.

2. Agriculture. No grain production information is contained in the digest and the agricultural section is drastically reduced, compared with previous issues. Production on the New Lands is omitted -- the last good yield on this answer to the Soviet's grain needs was in 1953. The current free world estimate of the 1963 wheat crop shows that it was 17 million tons below that of 1962, itself not a good year. The USSR arranged to import some 11 million tons of wheat and flour during 1963-1964. The crisis in agriculture is known to have been building up for some years as a result of practices in which the soil was mined and depleted, machinery was not made available, fertilizer was not produced in sufficient quantity, and similar malpractices were committed which could have been avoided. The debacle is all the more spectacular because K. personally dictated agricultural policy in every detail, promised the people increasing supplies of food, and predicted an early equality with the USA. The failure of the grain crops forced the slaughter of livestock which in turn means that the very dairy and meat products promised to the population will be set back even further.

The four-page CIA press release of January 9, among other things on this sector of the Soviet economy, said:

A necessary corollary of the headlong rush to develop heavy industry was the neglect of agriculture. Starved for investment funds, agriculture was faltering badly by the time Stalin died. Khrushchev succeeded, at very small cost, in temporarily reversing the downward trend. The New Lands put more grain into Soviet stomachs, into livestock, and into foreign markets -- perhaps most importantly from the standpoint of political stability, into the European Satellite countries to make up deficits in their own laggard farm output. But the returns from the vast new acreage plowed up in 1955-59 proved to be temporary. Once the original soil moisture and fertility were used up, output fell off. In 1963, a severe drought in the traditional farming areas, as well as in Kazakhstan and Siberia, resulted in a near disaster. Output on a per capita basis in 1963 was about 10 percent below that of 1953. Total agricultural output declined some 4 percent in 1962 and probably more than 4 percent in 1963.

The plight of Soviet agriculture is further illustrated by the composition of the Soviet diet. In total calories, the average Russian citizen is not far behind his American counterpart. But 70 percent of the Soviet diet consists of grain and potatoes, compared to 23 percent in the US. Only 25 percent of the Soviet diet consists of quality foods -- livestock products, vegetables, and fruits.

The impact of a short grain crop on this pattern of diet is obvious. Bread for human consumption must be curtailed. Livestock herds must be reduced. There is plenty of recent evidence on the disappearance of flour from stores, of distress slaughtering of livestock, and of the elimination of free bread from factory cafeterias.

3. National Income. Data on this subject in the digest is too sketchy to allow proper analysis. While there is a chart showing yearly changes in national income, it is given in percentages from the base year 1940! On the question of economic growth, Soviet officials reacted most strongly to the CIA public statement of a decline in the rate of the GNP to 2.5%. Soviet rebuttals were confused and contradictory, but careful analysis showed that they pretty much supported the 2.5% figure. The January 9 press release said:

Although the slowdown in industrial output has had its effect, the serious decline in economic growth in 1962 and 1963 is largely due to the failures in agriculture.

Although the Soviet economy, given more favorable agricultural weather, may be able to rebound from last year's growth of 2.5 percent, the prospects for recovery to a sustained growth rate equal to that of the 1950's are not bright.

ACTION: To keep alive the image of grave and well-nigh insoluble problems in the Communist economic system, use any appropriate report or information on Soviet Bloc economic affairs as a peg. Target audiences are, particularly, individuals and groups concerned with developing economies, and Communists and radical leftists in all countries.

The withholding of information from the Soviet people (as well as from free world governments, economists, etc.) in the 1963 economic digest warrants special treatment in serious journals as well as speculative articles elsewhere. It is, for example, a change of policy from 1962 (to say nothing of the 1920's) when considerably more detailed data was presented. But 1962 was before the true state of the Soviet economy had been exposed and the need for grain had become so great that the USSR could no longer deny facts. Soviet efforts to buy basic machinery and plants as well as to obtain long term credits from the free world further belied the Kremlin's picture of the Soviet economy.

It is possible that the authorities in the Soviet Union are still trying to arrive at the true facts -- or at least to agree upon one set of facts. Account books have been juggled for so long, figures confused by using different base years, criteria and definitions, and indices (or percentages) used rather than concrete figures, that it is no wonder there is a delay in producing a new official digest of economic data. However, the delay might not have come if the free world had not successfully contested Soviet figures. The failure of the CPSU to fulfill its many promises to the people is bad enough; but deliberate government deception (a Communist custom) can only cause citizens to lose faith in the regime.

Generally speaking, the Soviet leaders will publish plans and programs sooner or later which will look very good. Total production figures will be impressively large; goals will probably be low enough to permit overfulfillment; certain imbalances in production will be corrected; irrigation and other large undertakings will be dramatically publicized. In our reporting and commentary on these announcements, we keep things in perspective by pointing out what is not in the plans, noting for example that:

the building program includes all of the unfinished structures and the promises of former years, e.g. for much needed housing;

increased investment in certain sectors is a necessity

goals are substantially lower than previous plans, but even so we shall no longer look at promises but on performance since the history of shortfall is so voluminous;

Khrushchev's promise to catch up with the US in meat and dairy products can not be fulfilled -- the livestock slaughtered as a result of two years of disastrous grain crops has set the promised and over-optimistic date back even further;

while fertilizer may be amply supplied -- it may not be well distributed -- it is probable that farm machinery will not be in sufficient supply to meet the pressing needs of farmers.

Wherever possible, we comment upon the inevitable administrative, bureaucratic problems of the Communist system where the needs of the people compete with the desires of the military and the power of the Party, and where the whole economy is subject to the major and minor foibles of functionaries.

The record of unfulfilled Soviet economic programs should be treated in the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Pravda's two-part editorial "On Certain Aspects of Party Life in the CPSU" (23-29 April), among other things, attacks the Chinese for their economic failures, saying "the Chinese leadership has not even considered it necessary to give an account of themselves" on plan fulfillment. "They lack the courage to tell of the shameful failure of the fantastic leap forward." Neither did the Soviets tell of the untold thousands of deaths brought about in their early efforts to collectivize the rural countryside, or the hardships of tilling the New Lands, let alone the steadily declining agricultural yield brought about by mining the soil and refusing to provide adequate tools and supplies to the farmers.

References -- See BPG's #134, 135, 137S.

-- Current Intelligence Weekly Summary "USSR Cuts Published Economic Information" 3 May 1964 Secret.

-- "Current Economic Weaknesses in the Soviet Bloc and Communist Asia" -- OVO (Sent to posts by CA - 7322, January 24, 1964)

-- Propaganda Notes 44 (A) "Soviet Economic Propagandists in Confusion" (w/uncl. attachment)

-- Watch Press Comment for continuing flow of articles.

739. The CPSU-CCP Exchange of Letters: A Propaganda Bonanza.



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BACKGROUND: All Peking papers on 9 May carried the full texts of an exchange of 3 CPSU and 4 CCP letters which the CPSU probably did not want to see published. Despite their combined length of about 19,000 words, they are relatively terse and "meaty." They provide an unparalleled exposure of the political warfare between the two protagonists.

Quotes from the NCNA texts are in the attached unclassified summary review. The full texts in NCNA's English are in FBIS Far East Daily Report Supplement No. 6 dated 11 May. However, the multi-language versions published by the Chinese will be most useful for field use: they are carried in full in the May 8 Peking Review (now in English, French, Spanish, Japanese and Indonesian editions) and in separate pamphlets (no information now available on languages other than English and Chinese).

Evidence in late September and October indicated that the CPSU was preparing to call for an international meeting of parties to achieve "excommunication" of the CCP, but that several important Soviet-sympathizing parties opposed the move -- led by the Italian CP which stated its views in a 12,000-word plenum statement in l'Unita 26 October. Thus, the 7 November anniversary of the "October Revolution," which would have served admirably as a public platform for launching a conference call, passed uneventfully with Khrushchev calling once more for an end to polemics.

(i) The Khrushchev-signed CPSU letter of 29 November to Mao must be read against this background. In contrast to the militant Soviet statements of September - October -- including the massive October Kommunist editorial calling upon every Communist everywhere to "fulfill his international duty" by helping to stop the Chinese -- this letter exudes a spirit of fraternal reasonableness. It urges that the two parties put aside their differences "until the heat of passion has cooled" and concentrate on their common interests and tasks, proposing such "concrete measures" as expansion of trade, "broadening of technical assistance, including the sending of Soviet specialists if desired, and scientific, technical and cultural ties, settlement of boundary questions, and, as a sine qua non, the cessation of polemics and factional activities. The degeneration of communication between the two is striking in the plaintive note that "Comrade Chou En-lai is reported in the press to have declared in recent talks with foreign personalities and journalists" that China wants better relations. Khrushchev's letter concludes by affirming that its proposals are intended to create more favorable conditions for preparation of a world meeting, -- which both "have more than once advocated."

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(ii) On 20 February, that is, almost 3 months later, the CCP wrote a brief letter saying that they had "learned from a number of quarters" that the CPSU had, secretly and behind the back of the CCP, sent a 12 February letter to other parties which "distorts facts," "manufactures lies," and "instigates struggle" against the CCP on the "pretext" that the CCP has not answered the 29 November CPSU letter. After denouncing the CPSU for regarding their letter as "God's will," demanding an immediate and affirmative reply, the CCP says the 29 November letter will be answered in due course and requests a copy of the 12 Feb. letter. This and all subsequent letters were signed only by the respective Central Committees.

While the Soviets had refrained from (overt) anti-Chinese propaganda or political activity since 29 November, the Chinese had continued their campaign with increasing belligerence. On 12 December they published the 6th in a series of People's Daily /Red Flag "comments on the 14 July CPSU open letter," a hard, bitter, 13,000-word blast on "Two Diametrically Opposed Policies." On 4 February they followed with the 7th, an 18,000-word diatribe which is the most deadly "declaration of war to the finish" on the CPSU and Khrushchev yet published. The CPSU "agricultural" plenum which convened on 10 Feb. was expanded on the 14th to include thousands of ideological workers in secret sessions at which Suslov was reported to have delivered a major speech on the problems with the Chinese.

(iii) The CPSU answered the 20 Feb. CCP note immediately -- dated 22 Feb. -- justifying their 12 Feb. letter on the basis of Chinese conduct and stating that "it was unnecessary and even useless" to send the CCP a copy. Accusing the CPSU of splitting activities is like a real culprit crying "stop thief." "With what purpose" was the CCP letter sent: "aggravation" and "exacerbation." It closes by reaffirming that the CPSU "is always ready to do everything in its power for unity."

(iv) On Feb. 27, the CCP retorted, reiterating its charges with supreme arrogance, taunting the Soviets -- whose "bluster is like a pewter-pointed spear": "please produce all the magic weapons in your treasure box" -- e.g. the "most resolute rebuff," "collective measures," etc. It proposes an agreement on reciprocal publishing of all materials, "if you do not fear the truth and the masses."

(v) On Feb. 29, the CCP followed up with a long reply to the original 29 November CPSU proposal for "concrete measures." It denounces scathingly the Soviet maneuver: we "will never be misled by honeyed words or bow under pressure or barter away principles." Although seeming to comment reasonably (perhaps deceptively so) on boundaries, it sneers at aid and trade offers, describing the harm done by Soviet efforts to use economic relations for political ends and declaring: "the Chinese people cannot trust you." Calling the Soviet approach "an utterly false and demagogic trick," the letter lists "a whole series of

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important questions of principle" on which they are opposed, "issues of such magnitude" that they cannot be "evaded" and "permit no equivocation." Quoting a dozen of the more colorful epithets applied to them by the Soviets they ask how the CPSU leaders can even talk of unity under the circumstances and repeat their taunts. However, the CCP concludes by affirming willingness "to do its best" for unity and proposing "adequate preparations" for a world meeting, with the resumption of Sino-Soviet talks in Peking 10-25 October, and a preparatory committee of 17 parties meeting at an unspecified later date.

(vi) The last CPSU letter in this exchange, dated 7 March, consists largely of recriminations based on the Chinese letter of 27 February. Asserting flatly that "there are no, and cannot be any, 'father' or 'son' parties," the CPSU seems to be making a renewed plea for cessation of polemics and discussions "with tact and self-respect," -- but then they torpedo their own effort by adding that "if you were really interested" in unity, "you should have accepted our proposals long ago!" Tacked on to the end, however, is an acknowledgement of receipt of the 29 Feb. letter, which "rejected all the proposals we made." The CPSU "resolutely repudiates" all of its "libelous attacks" and promises to give an answer to it. However, in the present letter it is necessary to comment on "the question which worries the whole Communist movement," preparations for a world meeting. The CPSU questions Chinese motives in delaying the steps so long and proposes a greatly accelerated schedule, leading to a world meeting in autumn 1964.

Two days later the Chinese published the 3th article in their joint series, another 13,000-word tirade calling on all Communists to "repudiate and liquidate Khrushchev's revisionism," and on 3 April the CPSU launched its new polemical campaign with the publication of the February plenum materials.

(vii) Two months after the date of the last CPSU letter, the CCP replied with a belligerent blast dated 7 May: it denounces Soviet hypocrisy of word and deed, calls the Soviet timetable "a step in your plot to accelerate an open split," repeats the taunts of "empty threats," and finally says that, "judging by present circumstances," it will be necessary to delay still further, with Sino-Soviet talks coming perhaps in May 1965, and with 4 or 5 years or longer necessary to prepare for a world meeting! It also clearly "forewarns" the CPSU that any attempt to convene a meeting of its sympathizers and call it a world meeting would put the responsibility for a split directly on them. The CCP closes by stating its intent to publish the texts of these letters and repeats its taunting proposal for reciprocal publication of all materials.

ACTION: These CPSU-CCP letters, intended -- at least by the Soviets -- for private communication between Party leaders, expose Communist tactics and strategy more dramatically and

convincingly than most other evidence. The bitter mutual recriminations and the self-righteous hypocrisy of each in charging the other with unscrupulous, self-serving political propaganda manipulations, and evidence of betrayal by other Communists, all expose basic vulnerabilities in the theory and practice of Communism. The following points are suggested particularly for Communist and left-wing intellectuals, and for friendly neutralists, in media and through personal contacts.

1) Neither the CPSU/USSR nor the CCP/CPR is fit for world leadership. Both aspire to domination (they use the term "hegemony") first over the Communist world and then the whole world. Both constitute a threat to all who risk involvement in substantial relations with them on the party or state level. The CCP (29 Feb letter) says "To be frank, the Chinese people cannot trust you /CPSU/" and gives a bill of particulars of Soviet efforts to use economic relations "as an instrument for exerting political pressure," to "infringe the independence and sovereignty of fraternal countries." Betrayal and counter-betrayal by Communist parties and individuals is spelled out in the letter exchange (e.g. efforts of each to suborn the Albanians in 1960; quick disclosure to CCP of the "secret" 12 Feb. CPSU letter). Soviet efforts to plunder the economy of a satellite are now being described in detail by the Rumanians /so far classified information which will probably seep through into the press/ after they were broadly hinted at in their 22 April plenum statement. The broad line: if fraternal Communists -- in Party or State relations -- cannot trust each other, then no one else can.

2) Trade and aid for control in developing (and also developed) nations. The 29 Nov CPSU letter offering concrete agreements in trade and other relationships, might appear reasonable and constructive even to leaders in developed countries. But the Chinese, well schooled in Communist tactics, readily unmasked this Soviet maneuver.

3) Wide range of unscrupulous Communist tactics. The letters document more than the Communist strings attached to trade and aid: many standard tricks in the Communist cold war armory are detailed in the charges of lies, distortion and quoting out of context, provocation by delay, and betrayal.

4) Communists fear a really informed, participating populace. The 7 March CPSU letter explains its refusal of the CCP proposal for reciprocal publishing of all materials bearing on the dispute, saying: this would extend the party polemics to "the peoples of our countries" and "would only arouse a feeling of legitimate indignation among the Soviet people." And this from a party which describes itself as representing the whole people!" The Chinese, whose motives in publishing CPSU

materials are hardly what they claim, accuse the CPSU of "fearing the truth and the masses," and "treating them as rabble." We should do the same toward both parties, but more particularly we should help provide all the truth.

5) Black propaganda to Communist audiences. Both sides have threatened further disclosures (CPSU 22 Feb: "One could cite innumerable facts and if necessary publish documents that expose the behind-the-scenes activity of the CCP..."; CCP 27 Feb: "We could cite a wealth of facts [about tricks you have played]"). We should furnish some of these wide-ranging new "facts." The Rumanian "declaration of independence" -- the 22 April plenum statement -- said "there is not and cannot be a 'parent' party and a 'son' party." This statement is identical with one in the 7 March CPSU letter. We speculate whether the Rumanians forced this on the Russians, and wonder further about the rest of the Rumanian "declaration."

We also use quotes from the CPSU letters to taunt K for "turning the other cheek," begging for sweet reasonableness despite all the arrogant blasts of icy Chicom hatred.

1 June 1964

790 FE, a. Stalinism and the Chinese Communists

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BACKGROUND: Communist governments have a long record of harshly repressing their own peoples and of encouraging, (sometimes assisting), other peoples to attempt violent overthrow of their own legal governments. The cruelty exercised by the CPSU in the days of Stalin inflicted untold hardship and suffering on the Soviet people, and unfortunately for the Chinese people, the dogmatically Stalinist CCP refuses to benefit from the experience of others. Communist governments autocratically decide what the people want, regardless of the suffering their decisions impose. CCP slavish adherence to dogmatic theoretical solutions has produced crude policies and programs for almost all of their critical problems, for example: forced colonization and prejudice against ethnic minorities; unrealistic agricultural programs; premature, forced industrialization; aggressive and predatory foreign relations; and a cult of personality.

Ethnic and National Minorities: Stalin pursued policies to assure Russification of all of the USSR. All of the so-called autonomous republics and regions were compelled, for example, to concede the primacy of the Russians (their conceded right to self-determination was forcibly withdrawn), to have their children taught Russian rather than their native language and to have Russians assigned to all the top Party and government posts throughout the Soviet Union. In extreme cases, ethnic minority groups were deported en masse or even liquidated altogether. The Han Chinese are no less chauvinistic in their attitude toward minority groups in China and no less reluctant to apply terror when less repressive measures fail to solve their problems. The Han Chinese force their language on all other nationalities, they wipe out races by such tactics as colonizing the chosen people in minority regions and forbidding Mongolians to marry Mongolians. CCP treatment of the Tibetans leaves no doubt as to their willingness to commit cruel and brutal genocide when their objectives cannot be achieved by other means.

Agricultural Policies: In a headlong attempt to solve Russia's agricultural problems, Stalin initiated forced collectivization on the Russian peasants, expecting to bring them completely under State control. This frantic and ill-advised policy alienated the peasantry, increased Russia's agricultural problems, and caused hardship and starvation for untold millions of Russian peasants. The CCP took a similar approach in the formation of the communes as part of the Great Leap Forward. The result was remarkably similar to those of Stalin's forced collectivization: an alienated peasantry, still unsolved agricultural deficits and starvation in the countryside. [See

Khrushchev's April 15 pithy remarks on agricultural failures -- pages 4-5 of "Chronology--Communist Dissensions #27" in BPG #140 of 4 May 1964.]

Forced Industrialization: Stalin dictated "priority development of heavy industry" for the Soviet economy. This policy meant two things for the Russian worker: his daily work norms would be increased constantly to meet the unbridled demands of the Communist planning chiefs; and, under conditions where there was sometimes a desperate need for consumer goods the people's desire to improve living standards was pushed ever further into the future. Chicom economic planning experts are following a similar program with special efforts devoted to developing a nuclear-explosion device. This was preceded by erratic industrialization plans for which there was neither the trained manpower nor the equipment -- facts which the CCP after some 15 years in power is just recognizing. The Communist regime sets goals for its own political purposes, sacrificing the Chinese people for the attainment of "prestige" and power objectives. The latest development is the application of a military system of discipline and control to factory workers. (SEE BPG #141, item 783, dated 18 May 1964.)

Foreign Policy: Stalin's foreign policy in the post-World War II era was characterized by constant aggressive pressure against all foreign countries, including other Communist countries. (It was this demanding, suspicious posture and attitude that drove Yugoslavia out of the Cominform.) The Berlin blockade and the Korean War were examples of attempts to take by force and violence what could not be taken by peaceful means. [Khrushchev's use of armed force in Hungary is a piece of the same pattern.] The Chicomos mirror this Stalinist attribute in their arrogantly belligerent stand toward the rest of the world. Their rejection of the nuclear test-ban treaty and their encouragement of subversion and insurrection in Southeast Asia are but examples of their basic foreign policy. Like Stalin, they mistrust all foreign countries, including Communist-ruled countries from whom they demand unquestioning obedience.

Cult of Personality: The Stalinist period was characterized by the illogical assignment of all wisdom and all virtues to the supreme leader. Pravda trumpeted Stalin's perfection in each issue, calling him "...the greatest scholar of our epoch, ...the greatest military leader of all times," and so forth through the whole list of human endeavors. His subordinates were required to pay him regular and frequent obeisance. One Nikita S. Khrushchev, for example, said on January 31, 1937: "Stalin is hope, he is expectation, he is the beacon that guides all progressive mankind. Stalin is our banner! Stalin is our will! Stalin is our victory!" A book called "Russian Land," published by the Komsomol in 1946 said: "Stalin! Always we hear his dear name. And here in the Kremlin his presence touches us at every step. We walk on stones which he may have trod only recently. Let us fall on our knees and kiss those holy foot-prints." Today in China, Mao Tse-tung is the same.

Lyrical expressions of his wisdom and of the correctness of his policies are commonplace. Radio Peking recently called Mao's thoughts "the lighthouse which illuminates all our work and the compass needle for China's socialist revolution." The July 1, 1963 issue of China Youth said "as fish cannot leave water and infants cannot leave their mothers, so revolutionary cadres cannot leave Chairman Mao's works." The image of an infallible leader of a dictatorial regime serves several purposes, among the most important of which are to cover up a record of failure, to make the people believe that their sacrifices have not been in vain, and to imbue them with confidence that the Leader can answer any problems and assure success, which is always just around the corner. The infallibility image also serves to give outsiders the impression that everyone is united in strength behind "the wise one."

Chicom Defense of Stalin: While the Chinese Communists are Stalin's chief defenders, they paid remarkably little attention to his advice during his lifetime, particularly after the mid-1920's when his insistence on an urban-based, proletarian-led revolution almost brought about the destruction of the CCP. After that time the Chicomps virtually ignored Stalin's advice although they did not openly challenge him or his right to give them advice. In the 1940's Mao ignored Stalin's advice to enter a coalition with Chiang Kai-shek and to integrate the Communist army into the Chinese armed forces at the end of the war against Japan in August 1945. Mao's decision to pass from guerrilla warfare to an all-out fullscale offensive in mid-1948 was also taken against Stalin's advice. The extreme irony of the present situation in the Sino-Soviet dispute is that the Chinese Communists, Stalin's arch defenders, are following policies advocated by Trotsky, and at the same time are accusing the Soviet Union of Trotskyism!

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"Revolutionary" policies fail: Stalin's devotion to outmoded theoretical and ideological conceptions--and his easy resort to force and violence to get compliance--were the cause of his errors. Economic, social and cultural advances in the Soviet Union came when harsh measures and dictated solutions were relaxed, not when tighter controls of farmers, laborers,

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writers and artists were imposed. In spite of the tragic experiences of the Soviet Union, the Chicom leaders are subjecting their people to the same needless and futile suffering--to empty stomachs, to anguished separation of families, and to the unemployment that accompanies stagnant economies. So-called revolutionary policies do not build a viable society, they only sacrifice two or three generations of people in failures that could easily be avoided. So long as China's leaders think in the outmoded and discarded revolutionary theories of Stalin, they will fail to call forth the diligence and ingenuity of the Chinese people and the opportunity to build a new, modern structure on the foundation of China's natural resources will pass them by. But Communist revolutionaries (i.e. the first generations) know no other way. They came to power by the use of force and violence and those are the means they use to inflict their bankrupt policies on the people they rule.

The facade of infallibility: Communist regimes attempt to create the image of an infallible leader to promote unity and strength as well as to cover up discontent, disunity and weakness. Both in the USSR during Stalin's time and in Mao's China there is much disunity between the regime and the people and among the leaders themselves. Illusions disperse with time and those who created or supported them have a difficult time justifying the role they played in creating the myth.

Chicom defense of Stalin: We question the Chicom's sincerity in their ardent defense of Stalin, particularly when they had so little regard for his advice when he was alive. The Chicoms defend Stalin not so much because they think he advocated the right policies, but because they approve of the methods he used, the same methods they now use. A story of how Stalin would have dealt with the CCP were he alive today would make interesting reading--as a fable perhaps. Or, on a different note, other articles might fictionalize how Stalin would have dealt with "the Mao clique" when they allowed the blooming of 100 flowers or how he would have reacted to the Great Leap Forward. Another idea for an ironical approach would be to say that the Chicoms consider Stalin and Trotsky a good team, Trotsky for his good advice and Stalin for his terroristic methods of control.

Nature of Communist Threat: We say that the breakup of the world communist movement into a radical-right group and a radical-left group does not mean that one or the other is more desirable or more dangerous to the free world. They are different kinds of threat and therefore they require different kinds of responses on the part of the free world. Subversion, economic warfare, and the gradual destruction of democratic ideals are as dangerous and repugnant in the long run as the immediately perceptible resort to force and armed invasions.

We remind that a basic tenet of the free world's foreign policy is that we are eager to establish peaceful relations with all nations, Communist as well as non-Communist, if they demonstrate their willingness to seek peaceful solutions to the world's problems and to adhere to and abide by the solutions thus reached. On the other hand, the free world will stand firm and strong in the face of hostility, aggression and belligerence from whatever quarter it may come.

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1 June 1964

791 NT,FE,e. The Communist Threat to Indian Labor

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BACKGROUND: The Indian national labor groups are creatures of the political parties, with the same general strengths and weaknesses and frequently with the same leadership. Therefore, the Communist labor center's current program of membership raids, jurisdictional disputes and labor agitation will, if successful, have a political effect beyond economic disruption. The strength the politicized labor groups can muster will be equally critical in two crucial domestic events: the early 1965 election in the Communist stronghold of Kerala and the eventual necessity of choosing Prime Minister Nehru's successor. New developments in two continuing international problems could put the same strain on political loyalties: renewed Chinese hostilities or clashes with Pakistan over Kashmir. Rising Soviet assistance to the Indian economy and defense adds another element with possible political consequences. Communist domestic gains on any of these occasions could dangerously cripple India's democratic development, her neutral stance in foreign affairs or her defense against Communist China's expansion into South and Southeast Asia.

REFERENCES: See the unclassified attachments to this issue and:

Current Intelligence Special Report, "Communist Unions Gain in India's Labor Movement", April 17 (SECRET)

Biweekly Guidances:

#729 Indian Politics and the Succession Problem (and unclass. att.)

#751 China Attempts to Split the Indian Communist Party (and unclass. att.)


#774 Two Indian Communist Parties?

Prop Note #45, International Communist Front Organizations (and unclass. att.)

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(791 Cont.)



792 WH The Chilean Elections -- A Contingency Guidance

25X1C10b

BACKGROUND: [For more complete background information, see unclassified attachment, The Chilean Elections, and its Spanish version, Las elecciones chilenas. Either of these may be passed to indigenous assets, but with the caution that they are to be used for the facts contained in them and n o t reproduced verbatim.]

It is a significant fact of contemporary history that no Communist party has ever come to power in national elections which were free and in which the voters had a reasonably clear choice. However, electoral trends of the last year or more in Chile have so increased the strength of leftist political forces that a victory of the Communist-led Popular Action Front emerges as a distinct possibility. For that reason, the elections scheduled for 4 September 1964 are perhaps the most important ever to take place in Latin America.

Presidential Election: A candidate must receive an absolute majority of the votes cast to be elected outright. If no one receives 50% of the votes in the 4 September election, a joint session of Congress will meet on 24 October 1964 to choose between the two leading candidates. This has happened in the last three elections, and in each case congress has voted overwhelmingly in favor of the candidate that came in first.

With few exceptions, all literate citizens are both eligible and obligated to vote. The number of citizens exercising their franchise has steadily increased in recent years, and it is estimated that some two and one half million will vote in September. Woman's suffrage came to Chile with the elections of 1952, and their vote has become an increasingly important factor in Chilean politics. They polled 30% of the votes for president that year; the proportion rose to 35% in the 1958 elections, and will undoubtedly be higher in 1964. Women in Latin America have tended to oppose Communist-backed candidates by small but often decisive majorities, a pattern which Chilean women have followed so far.

Political parties in Chile fall in the right-center-left spectrum usually associated with European parliaments. On the right, the Democratic Front (FD -- Frente Democrático), which controlled an absolute majority in congress, has recently dissolved into its separate components: the rightist Liberal and Conservative Parties and the centrist Radical Party (PR -- Partido Radical). Julio Durán Neumann, a senator and former president of the Chamber of Deputies, is candidate for president on the PR ticket.

On the extreme left, the Popular Action Front (FRAP - Frente de Accion Popular) is composed of the Communist Party, the Socialist Party and several minor leftist groups. The Chilean Communist Party, one of the best organized in Latin America, plays a dominant role in this coalition, although the candidate for FRAP, Salvador Allende Gossens, is a member of the Socialist Party. For nearly 20 years Allende has been a leader in this extreme leftist coalition. With the help of the Communist Party, he came in close behind Alessandri for second place in the presidential elections of 1959. In 1961, he was re-elected senator from Valparaiso, also with the help of the Communists. Since 1954, he has been a frequent visitor to the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Cuba, and is a staunch supporter of Fidel Castro.

The Christian Democratic Party (PDC -- Partido Democrita Cristiano) occupies a position somewhat to the left of center but between the PR on the right and FRAP on the left. Like most other Christian Democratic parties of Latin America, the Chilean PDC is ideologically closer to the Socialists than to the Christian Democratic parties of Europe. The candidate for the PDC is Eduardo Frei Montalva, Senator from Santiago. In 1958, Frei ran a poor third behind Alessandri and Allende. Normally unallied with any other party, the PDC may this time receive the support of the Liberal and Conservative Parties.

Campaign issues. Campaigning and voting in the Chilean elections will be carried out against a background of a number of vital economic problems which successive governments have been unable to solve: inflation, the steady rise in the cost of living, unemployment in the urban centers and underemployment on the farm, agrarian reform, nationalist resentments over foreign owned copper industry, which supplies over 60% of Chile's foreign exchange. Allende has promised that his first act as president will be to nationalize the copper companies. With this prospect, the companies themselves are reluctant to spend money on plant improvement and expansion. The nationalism that exercises the people over this problem is such a powerful force that no public figure dares oppose the trend and speak out in favor of the foreign companies.

According to current indicators, no one candidate is likely to win an absolute majority in the election. If Allende wins a plurality, the Congress will be faced with deciding whether to choose the second candidate, in accord with law but somewhat in defiance of recent practice, or cast their votes for Allende and totalitarianism.

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There is little that stations outside Chile can do to influence actual voting in the elections, against Salvador Allende. When stations do receive specific instructions, it will probably be to prepare public opinion, particularly in Latin America, against him in the event he should win the elections or be passed over by Congress after winning only a plurality.

Themes which stations outside Chile may be called upon to exploit to condition public opinion against Allende and against a Communist take-over:

a) Loss through expropriation. If elected, Allende will expropriate the foreign-owned copper companies. An immediate and massive flight of foreign and domestic investment capital will take place and plunge Chile into a state of economic chaos worse than that of Bolivia and comparable only to that of Cuba.

b) Loss of individual freedom. If a Communist-dominated coalition comes to power in Chile, the essential freedoms will little by little be lost: there will be strict government control of press, radio, television, education, and organized labor. People will no longer have freedom to move: they will be shot trying to escape to Argentina, Bolivia, or Peru.

c) Misuse of democratic procedures? Among intellectual audiences, we attempt to inspire a continual dialogue on the philosophical and ethical aspects of the very practical problem with which the Chilean congress may be faced: Does a people have a right to surrender that which we consider unalienable, or untransferrable -- its freedom? Even more, does a majority have a right to deprive a minority of its freedom. If 55% of the Chilean people -- or of the Chilean Congress -- decide they want a Communist government, they will not only be acquiescing in their own enslavement, but they will be dragging the other 45% down with them. It would seem to be the right and the duty of the minority to resist, especially in Latin America, where freedom occupies an exaggeratedly high place in the scale of values: "Liberty is the highest value," has come to be an axiom.

Erich HONECKER

Member, Socialist Unity Party (SED) Politburo and Secretariat. Since 1958 Honecker has been a member of the SED Politburo and Central Committee Secretary responsible for security and military affairs. For nearly ten years (1946-55) he headed the Free German Youth (FDJ), which he patterned after the Soviet Komsomol; he has been a deputy in the Volkskammer since 1949 and is Secretary of the National Defense Council, created in 1960. As a staunch Ulbricht lieutenant, Honecker was nominated to supervise drafting of the new Party statute and to expound it at the Sixth SED Congress in January 1963.

Honecker was born on 25 August 1912 in Neukirchen in the Saar, the son of a miner who later became a Communist functionary. After completing elementary school, he learned the roofer's trade. He joined the Young Pioneers in 1922, the German Communist Youth Association (KJVD) in 1926, and the German Communist Party (KPD) in 1929. Elected KJVD Secretary for the Saar region in 1931 and a member of the KJVD Central Committee in 1934, Honecker engaged in illegal Communist activities in the Ruhr during the Nazi regime and served as courier between Berlin, Prague, Zurich and Paris. Arrested for the first time in 1934 and released for lack of evidence, he was charged again in 1935 and was eventually sentenced by the People's Court in 1937 to ten years in prison. He was liberated by the Soviet Army from internment in Brandenburg at the end of WW II.

In 1945 Honecker became youth secretary in the Central Committee of the KPD, helped organize the anti-Fascist youth committees, and edited the periodical Neues Leben. When the SED was established in 1946, he was elected to its Executive Committee, and also became First Chairman of the Central Council of the FDJ, the organization he had helped found.

After long membership on the SED Executive Committee, he became a candidate member of the Politburo in 1950. In 1955 he went to Moscow for a year's training at a party school, after which he assumed responsibility for security and military affairs in the SED Central Committee. At the Fifth Party Congress in July 1958 he was taken in as a full member of the Politburo, since which he has strengthened his position as potential successor to Ulbricht.

At the Sixth SED Congress in January 1963, Honecker served as head of the Congress Secretariat and as Chairman of the Statute Commission. In presenting the new Party statute, which defines rights and duties of Party functionaries, he was given the honor of making the only major speech besides that of Ulbricht. Honecker also delivered the Politburo report to the Second SED Plenum in April 1963.

Honecker has made many trips abroad in connection with his youth and Party activities, including visits to the USSR and Communist China. He has received numerous honors, including the Patriotic Service Order in Gold (1955). Honecker's first wife was Edith Baumann, who is a member of the SED Central Committee and until 1963 was a member of the Secretariat and a candidate member of the Politburo. Honecker's numerous affairs with young girls connected with the FDJ led his first wife to divorce him. Later he married Margot Feist, one of his mistresses who had born him a child. After marriage to Honecker, Margot Feist became Minister of Education in the Soviet Zone government and a member of the SED Central Committee. Honecker wrote one book entitled Friedensflug nach dem Osten (Peace Flight to the East), after he returned from a trip to the USSR in 1946.

The CPSU - CCP Exchange of Letters
Published by the Chinese Press 8-9 May 1964

All Peking papers on 9 May featured an 8 May NCNA release of the texts of an exchange of 3 CPSU and 4 CCP letters, beginning with a CPSU letter of 29 November 1963 and ending with a new CCP letter dated 7 May 1964. This heretofore private exchange provides an exceptionally revealing "inside view" of the status of the S-S conflict and indicates its future. The Chinese have published the texts in the multi-language Peking Review and in separate pamphlets. They are quoted and paraphrased below in chronological sequence.

I. 3,000-word CPSU letter: 29 November 1963. The letter, which contains not one critical word, suggests they "let [disputed views] wait until the heat of passion has cooled" and concentrate on "the development of cooperation, noting that "Comrade Chou En-lai is reported in the press to have declared in recent talks with foreign personalities and journalists" that China wants to develop contacts and trade with the USSR and other socialist states. "In this letter, we wish to give our views on the contribution which our two parties could make," proposing "concrete steps for setting things right in Soviet-Chinese cooperation," as follows:

(1) "In the course of the next few years, the USSR could increase its export to China of goods in which you are interested, and the import of goods from China...."

(2) "If your side shows interest, it would be possible in our view to come to an understanding on the broadening of technical aid to the CPR...." "Once again we affirm our readiness to send Soviet specialists to the CPR should you consider it necessary"

(3) "Both our countries would undoubtedly benefit from the broadening of scientific-technical cooperation and also from the development of cultural ties of many kinds...." "How beneficial was the influence of Soviet-Chinese economic cooperation on the course of socialist construction in the CPR, and also on the economic growth of the Soviet Union, is well known. It is all the more to be regretted that economic cooperation and trade ...has not only failed to grow in recent years, but on the contrary has constantly shrunk."

(4) "You will probably agree that the situation which has arisen in recent years along different sections of the Soviet-Chinese border cannot be regarded as normal. The SovGovt has already proposed that friendly consultation take place to define accurately the boundary in different sections," and "in this connection, we are transmitting to you a relevant document." "Statements have recently been made in China concerning the aggressive policy of the Tsarist government and the unjust treaties imposed upon China. Naturally, we will not defend the Russian Tsars who permitted arbitrary violation of the Soviet-Chinese border...."

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down the state boundaries with neighboring countries. We are convinced that you, too, do not intend to defend the Chinese emperors who by force of arms seized not a few territories belonging to others. But while condemning the reactionary actions of the top-strata exploiters who held power in Russia and China at that time, we cannot disregard the fact that historically formed boundaries between the states now exist. Any attempt to ignore this can become the source of misunderstandings and conflicts.... It would be simply unreasonable to create territorial problems artificially at the present time...."

(5) "We should also...bar any acts whatsoever that might undermine unity" and "repulse factionalists and splitters...."

(6) "The CC/CPSU has more than once advocated the cessation of public polemics.... We do not propose a general cessation of the exchange of views on questions of principle concerning world developments, but desire only that it should take place in the forms provided for by the statement of the fraternal parties (FP's) in 1960 -- through mutual consultation, negotiations, and exchanges of letters."

The letter then states that "in making these proposals, the CC/CPSU bases itself on the consideration that they will help strengthen confidence and create more favorable conditions for the preparation of a world meeting of the Communist and workers parties. Recently, the CPSU and the CCP, like many other FP's have more than once advocated the convening of such a meeting. We now reaffirm this position of ours...."

"...We may differ in our understanding of this or that ideological problem, or in our estimates of specific phenomena of social development -- life will correct those who are mistaken.... But...the highest duty of Communists (is) to build unity....The peoples trust the Communists, and we are called upon to justify their trust."

The letter is signed by Khrushchev as First Secretary of the CC/CPSU. (All others on both sides in this series are signed only by the "Central Committee.")

II. 500-word CCP letter: 20 February 1964. It begins bluntly: "We have learned from a number of quarters that the CC/CPSU recently sent to fraternal parties (FP's) a letter which is directed against the CCP." It "distorts the facts," "manufactures lies slandering the CCP," and "instigated a so-called 'struggle against the great-power and Trotskyite views and the factional and disruptive activities of the Chinese leaders.'" This letter has not, however, been sent to the CCP, from which it has been kept a secret."

"...While crying for a halt to public polemics under the pretense of desiring unity, the CPSU leaders are engineering a new campaign against the CCP and other M-L parties behind the back of the CCP and are unscrupulously engaging in sectarian, factional, and divisive activities.... Your vicious two-faced

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tactics are a gross violation of the principles guiding relations among FP's...."

"You have launched the present campaign against the CCP on the new pretext that the CCP has not yet replied to your letter of 29 November 1963. But we would like to ask: Why were you free for a long time to act wilfully and refuse to accept the advice of FP's against bringing inter-party differences into the open before the enemy and their proposal for a halt to public polemics, whereas the CCP must regard the letter from the CPSU leaders as God's will and give an immediate and affirmative reply or else be charged with the major crime of insubordination? Why are you privileged to publish thousands of lengthy articles and other items attacking us, whereas we may not make any reply to set the facts straight and distinguish truth from falsehood? A journey has to be made step by step and problems have to be solved one by one. Your letter will be answered in due course. Your self-important and domineering attitude in maintaining that you can attack whenever you please and that we must stop as soon as you cry halt has fully exposed your inveterate habit of great-power chauvinism and posing as the 'father party.'"

"The present grave act of the CPSU leaders to create a split has once again brought to light the intrigue you have been carrying on in behalf of a sham unity and a real split. The CCP has been consistent in its stand of firmly defending the purity of M-L....We obey the truth and the truth only and will never trade in principles."

III. 2,000-word CPSU letter: 22 February 1964. "The rude tone and unworthy and insulting methods (of your letter of 20 Feb.)...give us the moral right not to answer it at all"

"It was no accident that we did not send you the letter of 12 February this year. In the past few months alone, the CC/CPSU has repeatedly approached the leadership of the CCP...with proposals that measures be taken jointly for strengthening unity....The CC/CCP has not considered it necessary even to reply to our proposals."

"If you care to refer to the above-mentioned documents and material [29 Nov. letter, CPSU Moscow proposals in July 1963 talks, etc], it will be easy to convince yourselves that they discuss the very same problems about which the CC/CPSU wrote briefly to the fraternal parties (FP's) in its letter of 12 February of this year."

"While not answering our letters, you at the same time unfolded a widespread campaign against the CPSU and other M-L parties and sharply intensified the schismatic factional activity....On 4 February this year, the newspaper Jenmin Jih Pao (People's Daily) openly called for a split...."

"In these circumstances,...the CC/CPSU...considered it necessary to discuss the question of its February plenum
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"Our [12 Feb] letter condemned the intention of the CCP leadership to create a factional bloc with a special program under its own hegemony....Our principled position on all the questions contained in the 12 Feb. letter was known to you long before we approached the FP's....it was unnecessary and indeed useless to send you our letter of 17 February.

"After all this, one can only be surprised at your allegations....As the saying goes among our people, this is using the well-known method in which the real culprit cries 'stop thief.'

"If one is to look for real doubledealers....As early as June 1960, Comrade Liu Shao-chi and other CCP leaders, in their talks with an Albanian delegation, slandered the CPSU...and tried to set the Albanian public leaders against the CPSU. These actions by the Chinese leadership evoked the just indignation of members of the Albanian delegation who openly said so to the Chinese comrades and informed the CC/CPSU....One could cite innumerable facts and if necessary publish documents that expose the behind-the-scenes activity of the CCP leadership....

"As for the CPSU, we do not conceal our views and activities....The CC/CPSU has not allowed itself to be provoked and has not taken the path of squabbling on the principle of 'spearpoint against spearpoint'....

"As for your attempts to juggle with words like 'great-power chauvinism,' 'self-important,' 'domineering,' 'inveterate habit of posing as the father party,' 'God's will,' etc., we have to tell you that the use of such expressions only testifies to the weakness of your position
....

"For 4 years the FP's of the world have been appealing to the CC/CCP to approach the matter from the viewpoint of common interests and to cease its attempts to impose its erroneous 'general line' on the WCM....but with growing ambition [the CCP leadership] is posing as the sole heir of the founders of M-L and the supreme judge as regards the theory and practice of Communism....

"Your great-power habits also appear in your last short letter when, addressing the CC/CPSU, you demand that it send to you its letter of 12 Feb. You do not request, but demand....This is not merely rude, but simply ridiculous.

"Your letter and its deliberately rude tone compels us to reflect once again: with what purpose was it sent?
....

"If the CCP leaders genuinely cared for the solidarity and unity of the Communist movement, they would have had to leave their erroneous path, cease schismatic activity, and take their stand in the same ranks as all the world's FP's...."

IV. 1,000-word CCP letter: 27 February 1964. "The characteristic feature of this letter (yours of 22 Feb.) is the pro-digality of the abuse...with which you try to evade the questions of substance....This is really a poor performance."

"You accuse us of behaving like 'the real culprit, crying stop thief!'" In fact, it is you who are playing the trick of 'the real culprit, crying stop thief'.... First, you have actually sent a letter behind our backs to FP's, a letter specifically directed against the CCP. Second, you are actually planning behind our backs to take 'collective measures' from which the CCP will be excluded, and to go a step further in splitting the ICM....

"You begin your letter with the assertion that you have 'the right not to answer at all'....We have advised you against impatience because we have not yet completed our reply to your numerous attacks. Whereupon you have flown into a rage, as if we had committed a monstrous crime. Please think the matter over calmly: can this be described as treating FP's as equals?

"Far from examining your own errors and publicly acknowledging and correcting them,...you have even produced the Belishova case of June 1960 as an important piece of evidence against us. But you have lifted a rock only to crush your own toes. Our exchange of views with the responsible comrades of a FP...was aboveboard, entirely normal, and beyond reproach. On the other hand, your intrigues in the question of Belishova can not stand the light of day....As early as January 1960, that is, 5 months before the Belishova case, you delegated Comrade Mikoyan to meet the leading comrades of Albania in an effort to engineer activities against the CCP....

"Yet, acting like 'knights for a day,' you state... that you will 'publish documents' and 'state our views openly.' Moreover, you declared on 21 September 1963 that you would give us a 'most resolute rebuff.' Have you not played enough of such tricks?...We could cite a wealth of facts, beginning from the 20th CPSU Congress....In our opinion, all your bluster simply reminds one of a paper tiger. It is like a pewter-pointed spear. Please produce all the magic wapons in your treasure box for our enlightenment....

"If you do not fear the truth and the masses, and if, instead of treating them as rabble, you have faith in the political consciousness and discernment of the members of the CPSU and the Soviet people, we propose that our two

parties reach an agreement by which each side on an equal basis, publish in its own press the documents, articles, and other material both sides have published or will publish in criticism of each other

In the last paragraph, the Chinese note that the CPSU accuses them of blundering in "demanding" rather than "requesting" a copy of the 12 Feb. letter. They reply satirically, "...we are now complying with your wish and request that you send us a copy...."

V. 5,000-word CCP letter: 29 February 1964, "in reply to the CPSU letter of 29 November 1963." It begins by asserting that "the differences between us...involve a number of major problems of principle" which "must be solved if our differences are to be eliminated..." The CCP views on "the general line" expressed in their letter of 14 June 1963 and other articles "are in full accord with M-L and the revolutionary principles of the Moscow documents." Direct comments on the questions raised in the CPSU letter follow:

(1) The Sino-Soviet boundary. "A legacy from the past, (it) can be settled through negotiation between the two governmentsbut "the Soviet side has made frequent breaches....," on the border," and has "flagrantly carried out large-scale subversion in Chinese frontier areas," etc. "Among all our neighbors, it is only the leaders of the CPSU and the reactionary nationalists of India who have deliberately created border disputes with China...."

"The delegations of our two governments started boundary negotiations in Peking on 25 February 1964. Although the old treaties relating to the Sino-Russian boundary are unequal treaties, the Chinese Government is nevertheless willing to respect them and take them as the basis for a reasonable settlement of the Sino-Soviet boundary question."

(2) Aid. The Chinese again acknowledge their appreciation of "the friendly Soviet aid which began under Stalin's leadership," but they do not like the way Soviet propaganda media beat the drum about their "disinterested assistance." "Far from being gratis," Soviet aid was mainly in trade, with China paying for everything, with interest where credit was involved. "...The prices of many of the goods we imported from the Soviet Union were much higher than those on the world market....Moreover, ...many of the mineral products [we sent the Sov U] are raw materials indispensable for the development of the most advanced branches of science and for the manufacture of rockets and nuclear weapons."

"As for the Soviet loans ...China used them mostly for the purchase of war materiel from the Soviet Union, the greater part of which was used up in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea...."

(3) Soviet experts. They were "made welcome, respected, and trusted by the Chinese Government and people," and we "still miss them to this day....When the CPSU leaders unilaterally decided to recall all the Soviet experts in China, we solemnly affirmed our desire to have them continue....But in spite of our objections you turned your backs on the principles...and unscrupulously withdrew the 1,390 experts..., tore up 343 contracts..., and scrapped 257 projects..., all within the short span of a month....Your perfidious action disrupted China's original national economic plan and inflicted enormous losses upon China's socialist construction....You took advantage of China's serious natural disasters to adopt these grave measures"

"Your action fully demonstrates that you...use the sending of experts as an instrument for exerting political pressure on fraternal countries, butting into their internal affairs and impeding and sabotaging their socialist construction.

"Now you have again suggested sending experts to China. To be frank, the Chinese people cannot trust you....

"We would like to say in passing that, basing ourselves on the internationalist principle of mutual assistance among countries in the socialist camp, we are very much concerned about the present economic situation in the Soviet Union. If you should feel the need for the help of Chinese experts in certain fields, we would be glad to send them!"

(4) Sino-Soviet trade. Nobody is in a better position than you to know the real cause for the curtailment of Sino-Soviet trade over the last few years. This curtailment was precisely the result of your extending the differences from the field of ideology to that of state relations...."

Moreover,...you deliberately placed obstacles in the way of economic and trade negotiations...and held up or refused supplies of important goods which China needs. You have insisted on providing large amounts of goods which we do not really need...while holding back or supplying very few of the goods which we need badly. For several years you have used the trade between our countries as an instrument for bringing political pressure to bear on China....

"You constantly accuse us of 'going it alone' and claim that you stand for extensive economic ties and division of labor among the socialist countries. But what is your actual record in this respect? You infringe the independences and sovereignty of fraternal countries and oppose their efforts to develop their economy....You bully those fraternal countries whose economics are less advanced and oppose their policy of industrialization and try to force them to remain agricultural countries forever and serve as your sources of raw materials and as outlets for

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your goods, for daily material countries which are
industrially more developed and insist that they stop
manufacturing their traditional products and become ac-
cessory factories serving your industries...."

(5) Stopping public polemics. You "provoked" and "imposed polemics on the entire ICM," asserting that to do so was to "act in Lenin's manner." That was "a bad thing." But "now, with the extensive unfolding of the public debate, the truth is becoming clearer and clearer and M-L is making more and more progress. What was a bad thing is becoming a good thing....It leads more and more people away from the bad influence of the baton and makes them think over problems independently...."

After citing a series of CCP offers to end polemics, which the CPSU rejected, and quoting an early (1960) Soviet statement calling for open discussions, the letter says

"But now you suddenly make a turn of 180 degrees on this question and say that we should let the differences wait. What are you up to? To put it plainly, you are merely resorting to this trick to deprive us of the right to reply ...after you have heaped so much abuse...."

The CCP letter then gives a detailed account of the "anti-Chinese campaign" carried on by the CPSU and a number of other parties, by name, in reply to which "we have all along exercised great restraint."

"How are you going to wind up the whole affair? Do you propose to come forward with a public statement admitting that all your attacks on the CCP are lies and slanders and removing all the labels you have stuck on it? Or will you insist that we accept your verdict, give up the revolutionary banner of M-L and kowtow to your revisionist line?"

"It is now perfectly clear that our differences with you involve...a whole series of important questions of principle, such as the following: Are the U.S. imperialists the sworn enemies of the people of the world, or are they sensible emissaries of peace?....Are the Titoites renegades or comrades?....Was Stalin a great Marxist-Leninist, or was he a murderer, a bandit and a gambler?These questions admit of no equivocation, but must be thoroughly straightened out. How can issues of such magnitude be evaded?...."

The letter concludes with an assertion that, despite everything, the CCP "is willing to do its best for the restoration and strengthening of unity and proposes "the following concrete measures:" resumption of the Chinese-Soviet party talks in Peking, 10-25 October 1964; followed by "further preparations" by a meeting of representatives of 17 FP's, including the ruling parties plus Indonesia, Japan, Italy and France.

VI. 3,500-word CPSU letter: 7 March 1964. The first 2,500 words are in response to the CCP letter of 27 February,
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which "has greatly astonished us." "You attempt to accuse our party of some sort of behind-the-scenes activity against the CCP and "wish to justify your own actions...by shifting responsibility to others," but "we can say with a clear conscience that we have no responsibility whatsoever for the situation that has been created."

"The central point of the 27 February letter of the CC/CCP is in fact a proposal for the intensification of public polemics. In proposing the conclusion of an agreement on mutual publication..., what you desire is, in essence, that the polemics between the parties should embrace the peoples of our countries....To publish your articles, which contain so many unjust assertions and slanders... would only arouse a feeling of legitimate indignation among the Soviet people....Indeed, the polemics you are conducting have long ago gone beyond the bounds of ideological dispute....You pour torrents of dirt over our party and our country, and are in essence employing the same tactics as opponents of the Soviet state, who try to divide the people from the Party and the Party from the leadership.Please consider what would happen if we too were to take your path and reply to you with the same abuse that you heap on us, and call upon the Chinese people to fight against their leadership...."

The letter refers to the CPSU's proposals in its 29 November letter for normalizing the situation. "While deliberately delaying an official answer to our appeal, you replied to it in fact by inflaming the polemics" and by "intensifying schismatic activities." The "campaign culminated in the 4 February article" which declared that a split is a "phenomenon conforming to laws": this disgraceful document, like other similar material, was distributed in huge numbers and broadcast all over the world by radio in Russian and other languages. Under these circumstances, we could no longer remain silent...."

Turning in a new direction, the letter says: "You constantly deck yourselves out as 'knights' of equality and at the same time try to convince people that the CPSU is clinging to the role of a 'father party.' We cannot avoid the impression that all this is done solely to enable you yourselves to fill the role of a 'father party.'...Even in Stalin's lifetime this role had become obsolete, although he did take such a position. ...But after Stalin's death, "on its own initiative, the CC/CPSU corrected Stalin's errors and restored the Leninist principle of equality in its relations....We withdrew our troops...liquidated joint companies...and took a number of other measures.... The CC/CCP at one time fully approved and set a high value on these steps....There are no, and cannot be any, 'father' or 'son' parties." No one will succeed in imposing his own views and attaching labels to all who disagree. "That is why, even today, we call on you yet to think over your viewpoints again ..."

After this "conciliatory" appeal, the letter states: "If you were really interested in strengthening unity...,

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then you should have accepted our proposals long ago. the more stubbornly you persist,... the more grounds will Communists and all progressive forces have to be convinced that the CC/CCP is not guided by the interests of socialism at all, but by incorrectly understood national -- in effect -- nationalist, selfish interests. We could refute point by point the slanderous accusations...but...you have no intention of seriously entering into the essence of the questions....We will not fall for any provocation...."

Only then does the letter acknowledge that "we have also received your letter of 29 February," from which "it is evident that you have rejected all the proposals we made...inventing different accusations against the CPSU and the Soviet Union. We resolutely repudiate all your libelous attacks...." The CC/CPSU will give its answer to this letter and will show the real meaning of your distortion.... But already in our present letter we deem it necessary to set forth our position on the question that worries the whole Communist movement -- that of ways to overcome the differences and attain unity and solidarity among the FP's."

The CPSU questions Chinese motives in delaying meetings when the "questions...and the aim" are..."perfectly clear," and, "at a time when the speediest possible settlement of existing differences is urgently required...."

The letter also questions the CCP motives in proposing only 17 parties for the preparatory meeting and finds it appropriate that the 26 parties which were on the drafting committee for the 1960 Moscow statement serve again. It then proposes an accelerated timetable: (1) CPSU-CCP meeting in Peking in May 1964; (2) Preparatory meeting of representative of 26 parties in June-July 1964; (3) International meeting in autumn 1964. The CPSU "emphasizes that for the successful implementation of all these measures it is necessary that there be a cessation of public polemics and an abandonment of all types of subversive and schismatic activity in the socialist community and the Communist movement."

VII. 3,000-word CCP letter: 7 May 1964. "In your letter (of 7 March) you talk glibly about your desire for 'the speediest possible settlement of existing differences' and 'the cessation of the public polemics...and about your willingness to do your utmost to help strengthen unity....' But the facts show the complete falsity of your fine words.... In writing the letter of 7 March you were simply playing a two-faced game.... Under the guise of 'deep concern....,' you were diligently preparing a new onslaught against the CCP and other fraternal M-L parties and hatching a big plot for splitting the socialist camp and the ICM."

"...You disagree with this reasonable proposal of ours and charge us with deliberate stalling....At first glance you are most eager and enthusiastic. But it is

the purpose of eliminating differences and strengthening unity that you have put forward this pressing timetable. On the contrary,...it is a step in your plot to accelerate an open split in the ICM....

"We would like to ask the comrades of the CPSU: Why were you in such a great hurry? Was it not your intention, upon our rejection of your proposal for holding the talks between the Chinese and Soviet Parties in May 1964, to use it as a pretext for brazenly and unilaterally calling an international meeting and effecting an open split?"

"Time and patience are needed" for the many preparations. For instance, we would have to receive a copy of the letter of 12 February...;we would like to see the magic weapons you threatened to use;...and we would have to answer your attacks and react to your new magic weapons. All this would take timeNow we again request you to send us the letter. If you go on refusing, our request will stand for 10,000 years."

"In these circumstances, how can the talks between the Chinese and Soviet parties and the international meeting of FP's be successful? What will there be to say, except for quarrels ending up in a fruitless adjournment, or a final open split with each side going its own way? Can it be that you are resolved to have an open split?"

"Comrades! We are against a split. Before all your vaunted magic weapons are produced, before each side's case and intentions are made clear, and before full preparations are completed, the holding of talks between the Chinese and Soviet parties and of an international meeting of FP's can only lead to a split, and to this we can not agree.

"Judging by present circumstances, not only is it impossible to hold the two-party talks in May, but it will also be too early to hold them in October. We consider it more appropriate to postpone them till some time in the first half of next year, say May, and if either the Chinese or the Soviet party then considers that the time is still not ripe, they can be further postponed."

The Chinese explain that they cannot agree to the 26 parties proposed by the CPSU for the preparatory meeting because "the situation now is vastly different from that in 1960. There are two parties in some of the countries mentioned in your list." They mention Australia, where Hill's party is M-L while the other is revisionist, Brazil and India.

no

The letter emphasizes that there is now/organization or body entitled to call international meetings, and for one or more parties to make a unilateral decision to call one would be "illegitimate and entirely wrong, and would lead to grave consequences." "If, in arrogant disregard of the advice of our

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party and of many other P.P.s; the CC/CPSU should...hurriedly
convene such a meeting....you would cast to the four winds the
banner of unity which you profess to uphold and would have to
bear the responsibility for a split....Do you want to put your-
selves in such an inextricable predicament?...Do not say that
you have not been forewarned."

The letter then notes that preparations for a world meeting
would require unanimous agreement at the preparatory meeting and
adds that, "judging by present circumstances, it may require
perhaps four or five years or even longer to complete these pre-
parations."

It concludes by saying that the CPSU "failed to give any
really tenable reason" for rejecting the proposed agreement on
reciprocal publishing of all materials and urges them to re-
consider "if you have real faith in the members of the CPSU and
the Soviet people as well as in yourselves." The CCP deems it
necessary to publish in full all of the letters in this exchange,
especially since the CPSU divulged and distorted some of the
contents, and it hopes that the CPSU will "be able to do like-
wise."

BOMBAY

GOD SAVE THE MOTHERLAND

THE CURRENT

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Exclusive

What Dange said to C.P.I. National Council on Apr. 12



"S. Amrat"

A Ringside Seat Report

THE RED FLAG (Lal Bavta) appears to be splitting in two. Those poor innocent mugs, who have been shouting for years "Lal Bavta Zindabad", believing that this was to take them to the Promised Land, will now not know which half to shout for — the half led by SHRIPAD AMRIT DANGE, whose letter to the British Viceroy in 1924 CURRENT was the first paper to publish, or for the other torn bit of the Red Flag, now waved by those who regard Peking — and not India — as their spiritual and eventual home.

CURRENT now brings to you a ringside-seat report of what the great Comrade Dange said at the C. P. I. National Council on April 12, when, pushed by his Comrades to the wall, he tried to defend his Chairmanship of the Party.

According to our report, Dange, finding that he was losing his hold even on his own 'rightist' followers, and because he was repeatedly being attacked and opposed by hostile elements within the Party, is said to have admitted to the C.P.I. National Council that it was true he received an annual salary of £ 5,000 sterling from the WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS.

The W.F.T.U. is a Communist front organisation, of which he is Vice-President, which pretends to have the welfare of the working classes near and dear to its heart. In reality, as

PATRIOT thought

CPYRGHT

it would be better"

is well-known, the W.F.T.U. is nothing more than a Communist organisation which has successfully been fooling the working classes of the world for a number of years.

£ 12,000 yearly for expenses

It is further reported to us that at this meeting Dange confessed that in addition to the £5,000, he also ANNUALLY received about £12,000 for his "expenses" in connection with his work for the All India Trade Union Council (A.I.T.U.C.).

In 1963 however, China, because of the split it had with Soviet Russia, had refused to pay her share of contribution to the W.F.T.U. on the ground that this is a Soviet-dominated organisation. So for the year 1963 Dange is said to have revealed that he only received £8,000 from the W.F.T.U. for his A.I.T.U.C. expenses instead of £12,000.

If this explanation he offered to his colleagues in the C.P.I. is correct, the conclusion to which we must regrettably arrive is that Mr. Dange and his Communist Party, which claims to have the cause of Indian nationalism at heart, was apparently continuing to receive financial aid from China right through 1962, even though this country was in the embarrassing situation of having to defend our homeland against the Chinese attack on India in October 1962.

At the meeting on April 12, Mr. Dange is further said to have revealed that "this year" (presumably 1964) he had so far collected Rs. 1,60,000 in Maharashtra for his Trade Union work. He is reported to have offered to place the accounts of the various Trade

Give us more means
to fight the menace
of Communism

—CURRENT



Dange

Lal bava will not flutter
any more

It appears that ever since the publication in CURRENT of the Dange letters, now guaranteed by his own comrades to be genuine letters, the more idealist among his colleagues, started bitterly to criticise and comment upon the alleged wealth which

Mr. Dange is reported to have accumulated.

At the Council meeting, defending himself against these thrusts from inside his own Party, Mr. Dange appeared to have made an attempt to show that his personal fortune (up to now unascertained) was a sort of ancestral wealth, even though the ancestry of this alleged wealth appears to some people to be somewhat nebulous.

Among the things Mr. Dange is reported to have revealed at the April 12 meeting to his colleagues was the alleged fact that his uncle was a Director of one of the biggest European hotels.

Mr. Dange, it is said, did not reveal the name of this hotel.

He is also reported to have made a further claim, which shocked a number of poor Communists present at the meeting. He is said to have claimed that his (Dange's) father owned 10,000 shares in the Scindia Steam Navigation Company. Mr. Dange did not reveal the name of this alleged holding.

Money from Russia

At this meeting (April 12) Mr. Dange, cornered from all four sides, is further said to have admitted that he, along with two Andhra Communist leaders, had received sums of money from the Soviet Union. Our report states that Mr. Dange did not reveal the quantum of the amounts alleged to have been received nor did he indicate what was the purpose of these alleged receipts of money from the Soviet Union.

The names of the two Andhra Communists whom Dange is said to have mentioned, are said to be Mr. C. Rajeswara Rao and Mr. P. Sunderayya.

Imported Paper

It is further reported that Dange admitted at the meeting (April 12) that he imported paper from the U.S.S.R. and that he sold it at a profit for the C.P.I.

He is said to have claimed that he fully accounted for his share of Soviet money received but he charged another Comrade (from Madras) with having received Rs. 30,000 from paper merchants who had obliged in the paper deal. The Comrade Mr. Dange named, belongs to the leftist faction in the C.P.I. He is one of Dange's main accusers since the first publication in CURRENT of the Dange letter.

Shares in PATRIOT

Mr. Dange is also said to have referred at the meeting (April 12) to his shareholding in "Patriot". Mr. Dange is said to have claimed that he originally gave a loan of Rs. 30,000 to PATRIOT and this loan was converted into shares in Mr. Dange's name. But Dange alleged that "Patriot", "because it thought it would be better", listed his shares in the abbreviated name of "S. Amrat".

THE COMMUNIST THREAT TO INDIAN LABOR

"In every trade and industrial union, cooperative association, factory, tenants' union, in every government institution everywhere, even though there may be only three people sympathizing with Communism, a Communist nucleus must be immediately organized. It is only the power of organization of the Communists that enables the advance guard of the working class to be the leader of the whole class. A few individuals, when they are virtually the only ones acting in concert for power goals, may be very effective." Second Congress of Communist International, 1920.

India's four principal trade union centers, each with direct ties to an Indian political party, share the internal divisions, the growing political strife and the foreign links of the sponsoring parties themselves. Their proportion of national membership strength is roughly comparable to that of their political parties. Although precise membership figures are difficult to obtain, the following 1963 estimates show the relative strength of the four. They claim to represent a total of nearly five million of the more than 19 million wage earners who are 10% of the total labor force (Indian population of 1961 was estimated at 441.65 million).

The Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), formed by Prime Minister Nehru's Congress Party, is the oldest and largest center, claiming approximately 33% of the country's trade unionists. Affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), INTUC's domestic affiliates include 20 regional branches, 14 industrial federations and 1,400 unions. By contrast to INTUC's union strength, the Congress Party itself received 45% of the popular vote in the 1962 national election.

The Congress Party, recognizing its organizational weaknesses and the inroads being made by opposition parties, appointed certain of its leaders to the task of revitalizing the party in anticipation of the 1967 national elections. No such Kamaraj plan (named for the Minister who proposed it) has been initiated for the INTUC, although it is just as badly needed. Weak and frequently feuding labor leadership, too often drawn from political rather than labor ranks, has increased the troubles of a weak organization and contributed to INTUC's inability to counter the Communist offensive.

The All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), whose general secretary is also Chairman of the Communist Party of India (CPI), claims nearly 20% of India's union members, a figure which contrasts with the CPI's 10% of the popular vote in 1962. The AITUC is affiliated with the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU); domestic affiliates include 16 regional branches and nearly 1600 unions.

organization. It has shown few signs of the Sino-Soviet loyalty battle which has split and threatens to weaken the CPI. Dange's pro-Soviet position has so far prevailed in AITUC.

The Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS), closely tied to the Praja Socialist Party, claims about eleven percent of the total union membership. HMS is also affiliated to the ICFTU. Domestic affiliates include fifteen regional branches and 322 unions. The Praja Socialist Party, once the largest of the non-Communist opposition parties, received some 7% of the popular vote in the 1962 election.

Smallest of the four centers, the United Trades Union Congress (UTUC) claims nearly 4% of the union membership. It is a creature of the (Trotskyite) Revolutionary Socialist Party. UTUC has no international affiliation but claims as domestic affiliates 9 regional branches and 327 unions.

The patriotic fervor with which India responded to the Chinese attacks of October 1962 forced the CPI and her labor adherents to halt their militant activities against INTUC, the Indian Government and the Congress Party. Within a year, AITUC resumed a wide-ranging program to increase the size and influence of her trade union groups. Organizational efforts include forming new unions, wooing established unions from INTUC affiliation and demanding recognition as industrial bargaining representatives. To gain their goals, and reestablish a reputation as the most militant of labor groups and to weaken and embarrass both the INTUC and the government, AITUC is using strikes, sabotage and mass demonstrations.

Key industrial plants are favorite targets. The Heavy Electricals factory at Bhopal, for example, was forced to close down for nearly three weeks in March-April 1964. Months of labor unrest and threats of violence or sabotage followed the government's refusal to recognize the Communist union (Heavy Electricals Servants Trade Union) claim to represent a majority of the workers. The Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh told the state Legislative Assembly that the trouble was caused by "not only Communists but Communists who had sympathy with China."

INTUC is organizationally too weak to contend with this no-holds-barred Communist campaign. In addition, INTUC is generally loyal to the Congress Party government whose efforts to industrialize and improve the Indian economy will be severely hampered by Communist sabotage, labor unrest and production slow-downs.

In classic Communist fashion, labor organizations are used for political purposes. AITUC's thousands agitate against the Indian government for CPI goals. Major labor policies are influenced, through Dange, by the Soviet-dominated WFTU of which he is a Vice President at an annual salary of £ 5,000 and

"expenses" of £ 12,000. Dange has also admitted receiving unspecified sums of money from the Soviet Union (and until 1963 from Communist China also) for unspecified activities, according to Current weekly of April 25, 1964.

The AITUC has agreed, no doubt under Soviet pressure, to attend a future Afro-Asian Workers Conference to be held in Djakarta under the sponsorship of Indonesian and Chinese Communists. All the indications are that the AAWC will be controlled by the Chinese Communists and their Indonesian friends, and the AITUC representatives will be able to do little but serve as willing Soviet lackeys.

THE CHILEAN ELECTIONS

It is a significant fact of contemporary history that no Communist party has ever come to power in national elections which were free and in which the voters had a reasonably clear choice. However, electoral trends of the last year or more in Chile have increased the strength of leftist political forces so that a victory for the Communist-led Popular Action Front emerges as a distinct possibility. For that reason, the elections scheduled for 4 September 1964 are perhaps the most important ever to take place in Latin America.

Chile is generally looked upon as one of the most advanced of the Latin American democracies. It has a long tradition of order and political stability. Unlike other countries in the area, it has only rarely resorted to force to solve the problem of presidential succession. Literacy is high -- 80% -- and the per capita income of \$300 to \$350 per year, though low by U. S. or European standards, is about twice the Latin American average.

But wealth and income are unevenly distributed, unemployment is steadily increasing, and inflation has made serious inroads in the real income of the wage earner. Measures taken during the last five years by President Jorge Alessandri to arrest inflation and stabilize the economy have been unpopular and only partially successful.

As a result, the gap between hopes and possibilities continues to widen and, despite the relative sophistication of the Chilean electorate, this creates a situation more than commonly favorable for political opportunists.

Under the present electoral law, separate elections are held for president, congress and municipal posts. Congressional elections were held in 1961 and are scheduled again for 1965. Municipal elections were held in 1963. Important dates in 1964 are:

21 July: final date for registration, cancellation or substitution of candidates.

4 September: presidential election day; a legal holiday

24 October: Congress meets in joint session to proclaim the winning candidate.

13 November: Inauguration of the new president.

In order to be elected outright, a candidate must receive an absolute majority of the votes cast. If no one receives 50%

of the votes, the joint session of congress must choose between the two leading candidates. This has happened in the last three elections, and in each case congress has voted overwhelmingly in favor of the candidate that came in first.

With a few exceptions, all literate citizens are both eligible and obligated to vote. The number of eligible citizens exercising their franchise has steadily increased in recent years, and it is estimated that some two and one half million will vote in September.

Political parties in Chile fall into the right-center-left spectrum usually associated with European parliaments. On the right, until it was recently disbanded, was the Democratic Front, composed of the rightist Liberal and Conservative Parties (PL and PCU for Partido Liberal and Partido Conservador Unido) and the centrist Radical Party (PR -- Partido Radical). In April, as a result of dissensions and fears of a victory by FRAP, the PL and the PCU withdrew from the coalition and are expected to support the Christian Democrat candidate. All that is left of the FD is Julio Duran Neumann and those segments of his Radical Party that have not deserted him for FRAP. Duran, one of the three probable candidates, has fought the Communists and extreme leftists since his student days. He was several times member and once president of the Chamber of Deputies and has been a senator since 1957. At 46, he is the youngest of the three candidates.

On the extreme left, the Popular Action Front (FRAP -- Frente de Accion Popular) is composed of the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, and several minor leftist groups. The Chilean Communist Party, one of the best organized in Latin America, plays a dominant role in this coalition, although the candidate for FRAP, Salvador Allende Gossens, is a member of the Socialist Party. For nearly twenty years, Allende has been a leader in extreme leftist coalitions. With the help of the Communist Party, he came in close behind Alessandri for second place in the presidential elections of 1958. In 1961 he was re-elected senator from Valparaiso, also with the help of the Communists. Since 1954, he has been a frequent visitor to Soviet Russia, Communist China, and Cuba, and is a staunch supporter of Fidel Castro. At one time a doctor, Allende abandoned the practice of medicine in favor of politics. He is 56 years old.

The Christian Democratic Party (PDC -- Partido Demócrata Cristiano) occupies a position somewhat to the left of center and between the PR (and the PL and PCU) on the right and FRAP on the left. Like most Christian Democratic parties in Latin America, the Chilean PDC is ideologically closer to the Socialist than to the Christian Democratic parties of Europe. Just before the elections of 1958, the PDC cooperated with other parties in bringing about the repeal of the Law for the

Defense of Democracy. This made the Communist Party legal again and helped the candidacy of Salvador Allende. Once more the PDC candidate is Eduardo Frei Montalva, fifty-three-year-old senator from Santiago. In 1958, Frei ran a poor third behind Alessandri and Allende. Normally unallied with any other group, the PDC will probably receive the support of the PL and the PCU. This windfall may well put him ahead of the other two candidates in September.

The National Congress is composed of a Senate of 45 members and a lower chamber of 147 deputies. Approximately half of the senators and all of the deputies are elected each four years. In the 1961 congressional elections, candidates ran under their own party label, as they are required to do by law, rather than under that of the coalition with which the party is affiliated. The following table shows the congressional strength of the separate parties of the right and center, but combines the votes which FRAP would probably be able to give to Allende. To these might be added some defectors from Duran's Radical Party, while Frei, currently leading in unofficial polls, will probably receive most of the votes of the Liberal and Conservative Parties.

	PCU	PL	PR	PDC	FRAP
Senate	4	9	13	4	15
Chamber of Deputies	<u>17</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>40</u>
Totals	21	37	52	27	55

The cleavage in the Democratic Front was precipitated by the results of a congressional by-election in Curico Province, on 12 March. Although the FD had led the PDC and FRAP by overwhelming majorities in the 1961 congressional elections and the 1963 municipal elections, FRAP won the by-election handily and, thereby, a substantial psychological victory over its opponents. In fact, Julio Duran was so discouraged that, for a time, he thought of withdrawing from the presidential race. Early in May, according to press and radio reports, Allende made several approaches to Duran, offering basic ministries, such as interior, defense, economy, in return for his support in the elections. According to latest reports, however, Duran will remain in the race and will offer the voters a choice, as he puts it, between two dogmatisms: Christian Democracy and the Popular Action Front.

An increasingly important factor in Chilean politics is the Women's vote. It was literally the women who elected Alessandri in 1958 and defeated Allende by giving him only 22% of their votes, as against 34% for Alessandri. Both Frei and Alessandri were favored percentage-wise, by the female vote. Woman's suffrage came to Chile with the elections of 1952, when they cast 30% of the votes for president. The proportion rose to 35% in 1958 and will undoubtedly be higher in 1964, although it will not approach 50% of the electorate. If Chilean women

follow the general example of their sisters in other Latin American countries, they will tend to be more anti-Communist than the men, and will again oppose the Communist-backed candidate.

Campaigning and voting in the Chilean elections will be carried out against the background of a number of vital economic problems which successive governments have been unable to solve. First, perhaps is inflation, a problem that is not understood by the electorate and about which there is not much agreement among either experts or politicians. People will tend to vote on the basis of faith in individual leaders who promise simple and painless solutions.

Unemployment is a problem compounded by a high birth rate and a steady migration of able-bodied people from rural to urban areas. There is unemployment in the cities and a labor shortage on the farms. Measures taken early by the Alessandri administration reduced unemployment from 10% to 5% of the labor force between 1958 and 1961, but there are indications that it has risen since then. All parties recognize the problem but differ in their solution: the rightist parties want to depend on free enterprises; the left demands nationalization of industry; while the Christian Democrats advocate a mixed economy of private and state capitalism.

Chile has an agrarian reform law, signed by President Alessandri in 1962, which authorizes the government to expropriate poorly used land, distribute it to the peasants, and reimburse the original owners over a 15 year period. However, the peasants needing land are so numerous and the financial means of the government so limited that agrarian reform will continue to be a campaign issue.

The copper industry provides 60% of Chile's foreign exchange and, through taxes on production, is an important source of direct income for the government. Ninety percent, of the industry is controlled by U.S. companies, which creates all the resentments common to a typical Latin American one-crop economy. Allende has promised that his first act as president will be to nationalize the copper companies. With this prospect, the companies themselves are reluctant to spend money on plant improvement and expansion. The nationalism that exercises the people over this problem is such a powerful force that no public figure dares oppose the trend and speak out in favor of the foreign companies.

For the World Communist Movement, the Chilean election will be something of a proving ground for two theories of revolution. The Chilean Communist Party is one of the oldest, best organized, and most disciplined in Latin America, and is still considered in the Moscow camp. It was there, in Chile, in the early 1930's that the concept of the popular front was put into practice for the first time in Latin America. The PCCh (Partido Comunista de Chile) still hopes to come to power by peaceful election

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rather than by violent revolution, although there are a number of Chinese-oriented Communists and socialists who do not want to "wait it out" with Allende.

According to current indicators, it is quite likely that no one candidate will win an absolute majority in the election. What will happen if Allende wins a plurality and an overwhelmingly anti-Communist Congress chooses the second candidate, in accord with law but somewhat in defiance of recent practice? There are those who say that the Communists will then attempt to seize the government by force.

On the other hand, the democratic-minded parliamentarians, faced with the above choice, may cast their votes for Allende. Eduardo Frei has confidence in both his people's democratic ways and their good sense: "It is the Chileans' very respect for their democratic constitution that can sell them into totalitarianism," he is quoted as having said. "But", he added, "they are too canny to let it happen."